Introduction

After bazel-bootstrap 7.7.1 was landed into Debian unstable, I'm working on packaging newer Mozc (Most famous Japanese input method editor) with Bazel.

Here is the blog entry initial efforts to build Mozc with Bazel at that time.

kenhys.hatenablog.jp

Why dh-bazel?

After that, newer Mozc packages are uploaded into experimental and moved to testing phase on experimental now.

mozc - Debian Package Tracker

When started packaging efforts for newer Mozc with Bazel, I'm a newbie to do it. Now I've got a knowledge to do it a bit, I want to know best practice on packaging X on Debian with Bazel furturmore.

Usually there are dh-X for buildsystem X on Debian, but it's not true for Bazel as far as I know. This is why I had started to write dh-bazel.

I've wrote initial dh-bazel prototype and post a mail to debian-bazel ML.

lists.debian.org

dh-bazel supports the following way:

%:
        dh $@ --buildsystem=bazel

override_dh_auto_build:
        dh_auto_build -- //:hello

If you want to build source under src, you could write d/rule like this:

%:
        dh $@

override_dh_auto_build:
        dh_auto_build --buildsystem=bazel --sourcedirectory=src -- //:hello

Conclusion

dh-bazel is in very early stage prototype, but I have succeeded to build newer Mozc with some modifications to Mozc debian/rules on experimental with dh-bazel locally!

dh-bazel is a thin wrapper for Bazel, so it does not reduce packaging glitches dramatically, but it helps some sort of packaging tasks IMHO.

There are some achievement with dh-bazel

• It helps to do similar building way like other debhelper buildsystem
• It sets comprehensive Bazel startup options
• It sets comprehensive Bazel command options
• If you want to set extra flags, just specify it as additional user options (--override_module=, and so on)

Note that it only simplify dh_auto_build stage, so you must manually install artifacts with .install or something correctly.

I hope that it will help package maintainer using Bazel in the future. (dh-bazel is not uploaded into debian/unstable yet, so stay tuned!)

Nheko is my current favourite client for the Matrix IM system, which is my favourite IM system.

Matrix is an open system with end to end encryption and Nheko is free software and runs well on Linux desktops and phones.

The Nheko client allows interaction with dbus which could be good for automating things, EG you could change the status message when unlocking the screen. I’m documenting the most useful ones here because they don’t seem to be documented anywhere else. I have filed a Debian bug about the activate room option not working. The qdbus6 program is the QT6 version of the dbus command-line query program, there are a range of other programs which work in much the same way.

# list all interfaces
qdbus6 im.nheko.Nheko / 
# get the version of Nheko
qdbus6 im.nheko.Nheko / im.nheko.Nheko.nhekoVersion
# list rooms in a dump of the data structures (pity it's not json or something)
qdbus6 --literal im.nheko.Nheko / im.nheko.Nheko.rooms|less
# join a room
qdbus6 im.nheko.Nheko / im.nheko.Nheko.joinRoom "#flounder-random:luv.asn.au"
# supposed to activate a room but doesn't
qdbus6 im.nheko.Nheko / im.nheko.Nheko.activateRoom "#flounder-random:luv.asn.au"
# set the status
qdbus6 im.nheko.Nheko / im.nheko.Nheko.setStatusMessage "whatever"
# get the status
qdbus6 im.nheko.Nheko / im.nheko.Nheko.statusMessage

Here are a couple of examples of using other dbus clients to get similar results. Note that the difference between the Debian version of Nheko (and maybe other recent versions) and what LLMs return for usage examples is that Debian has “/” as the path while the examples have “/im/nheko/Nheko”.

# list rooms via gdbus
gdbus call --session --dest im.nheko.Nheko --object-path / --method im.nheko.Nheko.rooms
# get status via dbus-send
dbus-send --session --print-reply --type=method_call --dest=im.nheko.Nheko / im.nheko.Nheko.statusMessage

I’ve long been interested in hardware key material storage devices. I’ve been a fan of yubikeys (I still remember when my fancy new NEO-N showed up), PIV (and its associated smattering of additional fields), SaaS HSMs, the kernel keyring, some tooling I’ve fairly satisfied with the design of at prior companies, and of course, our dear friend, the TPM. All that is not even to mention the scores of exotic hardware security modules one generally comes across from time to time when you’re keeping a sharp eye out that you wind up playing with.

The concept of storing private key material on a disk, or even having it in RAM has always skeeved me out, so I have a natural inclination to hardware modules, and how shifting keying material around can change your risks and threat model(s) in interesting ways.

I don’t remember when I first came across the MIFARE DESFire EV3, but a few weeks ago I did a deep-dive into the state of the art of authentication schemes using ID cards. My complete overview of what tradeoffs exist is pretty extensive (and likely not interesting to the vast majority of the world), but the tl;dr wound up being one of “use PIV” or “use MIFARE DESFire EV3”. I wound up picking DESFire for a recent project, and figured it’s worth talking a bit about what I learned, share some thoughts, and some code. That code is published on crates.io/desox, and docs, as is our custom, may be found at docs.rs/desox

DESFire supports DES (I’m sure most readers saw that one coming), 3DES (I didn’t bother playing with 3DES at all) or AES-128 (AFAICT always use this?) keying material. It’s worth noting that the DESFire only supports symmetric keys and is not designed for public key cryptography, and operates exclusively using shared symmetric key material. The DESFire EV series use those keys and related authentication schemes to interact with “files” stored on the on-chip EEPROM (2k, 4k, 8k, and 16k versions exist), or “applications” (groups of files and authentication keys).

Talking to a DESFire EV3

Interactions with the card are done over NFC (ISO/IEC 14443 Type A), and commands to/from the card may be in the usual ISO/IEC 7816-4 APDU format, or “unencapsulated” bytes sent to/from the card are sent using a fixed instruction set and return code structure – saving a few bytes per message. I’ve opted to use their undocumented and proprietary format – I found it easier to work with and with a maximum message of 60 bytes, the savings matter a lot.

While powered via NFC, the card maintains a small amount of state about the connection between the reader and the card in its RAM, including if the session is authenticated or unauthenticated. I’ll dig into how authentication happens later, but it’s worth knowing that sessions can become authenticated using one of the symmetric keys shared by the card and the reader. The vast majority of the DESFire commands I know about tend to work while either authenticated or unauthenticated, with a few exceptions (GetUid, ChangeKey, and ChangeKeySettings for example).

In general, I found working with this card particularly pleasant. There is a fair amount of backwards-compatible behavior and multiple methods of communication that confuse things a bit, but overall, it was better than average to integrate with. Kudos to the NXP team. If the docs on this chip were public, things would be orders of magnitude easier – it’s not entirely clear to my why they’re keeping so much of the interface documentation under NDA, but it’s the largest knock against the chip, by far.

Authentication

I found a lot of really great resources outlining how the handshake and protocol works for a DESFire EV3, especially from Ridrix, some public datasheets ThrRealRevK and posts from AndroidCrypto.

The gist here is that, because the DESFire only does symmetric key operations, the key exchange (a type of SKA – Symmetric Key Agreement) uses symmetric keys to establish a unique session key which is used to sign or encrypt data exchanged between the reader and the card. I’m not going to get too in-depth here, since there’s a ton of other resources out there to dig into – but I will do a quick high-level description to keep this post mostly self-contained.

The authentication protocol serves two main functions – to verify that both parties know the same shared secret, as well as to act as a SKA to construct a new session shared secret key. Here’s a quick overview of how a shared session key is derived between the reader and the card using our symmetric keys (AES-128 in the case below).

1. the reader requests to start authentication with the card (something like AA 00 to start an AES Authentication handshake with keyslot 0x00).
2. The card will then reply with AF (a status code that indicates more data is to follow), followed by 16 bytes (in the case of AES-128) of encrypted (using CBC) data.
3. The hosts then decrypts this block with the symmetric key from keyslot 0, returning the card’s session nonce.
4. The host generates 16 bytes (usually random) for its session nonce.
5. The host sends an instruction of AF (indicating a continuation of the previous command), followed by 32 bytes of encrypted data. When decrypted, the first 16 bytes are our nonce generated in step #4, followed by the 16 bytes provided by the card, decrypted in step #3, except where every byte is shifted to the left by one place (the 0th byte is copied to the end).
6. The card will reply with 00 indicating a successful operation, followed by 16 bytes, which when decrypted, is our session nonce from step #4, shifted to the left by one byte in the same way that we did in step #5 with the card’s nonce.
7. At this point, both the reader and card have confirmed the other party has the same symmetric secret key. The session is now “authenticated” and a “session key” is derived using the two nonce blocks. Two hashing keys (K1 and K2) are derived from this key, which is used to maintain an ongoing CMAC hash of the messages coming and going to/from the card.

From here on out, the session is “authenticated”, and responses from the card which were previously “plain” will now contain a 8-byte CMAC signature, which can be used to ensure that the replies in question come from the active session.

In my implementation of the handshake I opted to encode the handshake state into rust types, just so I wouldn’t make any mistakes. The Handshake type contains the session internals (session nonce values, keying state, to include IV, etc). This means the authentication flow (from within my code) uses the Handshake struct to generate the commands to send to the card in order:

/// Create a new `Handshake`, and return the
/// start auth command (something like `AA 00`)
fn Handshake::<Initial>::begin(
 output: &mut [u8],
 key: [u8; 16],
 key_id: u8,
) -> (Self, &[u8]);

After we get a reply back from the card (the encrypted version of the card’s session nonce, sometimes called Rnd_B in code I’ve seen), we transition states from Initial into HalfOpen.

/// Given the card's encrypted response, generate
/// our session nonce and generate a reply
/// (something that starts with `AF` followed by
/// 32 bytes of encrypted data).
fn Handshake::<Initial>::rnd_b(
 self,
 output: &mut [u8],
 input: &[u8]
) -> (Handshake::<HalfOpen>, &[u8]);

Now that we’re “HalfOpen”, we’re waiting to hear back from the card to ensure that it, too, can byte-shift our provided nonce. Once we have the card’s reply, we can check it using our complete helper, transitioning from HalfOpen to Successful.

/// Check to ensure that the card replied with
/// our nonce byte-shifted by one place, indicating
/// that they know the symmetric secret in
/// this key slot.
fn Handshake::<HalfOpen>::complete(
 self,
 input: &[u8]
) -> Handshake::<Successful>;

Once the Handshake is successful, the only thing left to do is consume the Handshake struct and turn it into the shared session key by running it through the key derivation function.

/// Consume the `Handshake` struct and return the
/// new shared session secret key.
fn Handshake::<Successful>::into_key(self) -> [u8; 16];

From here on out we can use this session key for the remainder of our interactions with the card – signing messages from (and sometimes to!) the card, or encrypted messages to and from the card. This key is used in CBC block mode, where the session IV is updated with the last block of the encrypted data.

Unit Testing

A nice proprietary of the SKA scheme we’re using as part of DESFire is that the derived session key is actually deterministic if you control your nonce RNG (ok, actually, pretty true for most key agreements, but anyway), which means it is possible to capture traffic over the NFC interface, and “replay” the NFC I/O with cooked RNGs and ensure byte-identical messages and keys are generated. Within desox-rs this is called replay (I’m creative), and I’ve got a few replay sessions checked into VCS, which exercise a signficant amount fo the API surface. All were derived from an actual session with a real DESFire card, and can be updated with a live card and a --cfg flag.

Each replay file is a set of lines (request-response transactions), each containing two space-delimited hex encoded NFC messages. For instance, here’s an authentication handshake in replay format:

1a00 afc7bbd82ff8fefae8
afc6dab54df2278d2952d560821be7e4c3 007d9abe94a9b14748

The code that generated that exchange came from the test stored adjacent to that file – a handshake with the default DES key (all zeros), and an RndA value hardcoded to 32c28fdafd3960de.

let mut card = card
 .authenticate_with_rnd_a(
 0x00,
 Key::Des([0; 8]),
 Key::Des(hex_literal::hex!("32 c2 8f da fd 39 60 de")),
 )
 .await
 .unwrap();

Since the card’s RndB is similarly unchanging (I’m replaying this file every time), this will always derive the same session key, which means messages (including encrypted ones or CMAC signed responses) will be identical, as well. If you’re playing with the DESFire yourself, feel free to grab my replay files if you need a “known good” baseline.

By default this will run using the MockBackend, replaying each file – expecting a byte-identical request, and responding with the harcoded customary reply. If the code (or test!) needs to change, updating the tests is done by swapping the MockBackend out for a real one. Since I had to do this a bunch during development, running cargo test with RUSTFLAGS="--cfg desox_replay_rw" will, on run, overwrite the replay file(s) for the executed test(s), ensuring all line-protocol changes are explicitly caught and reviewed.

Observations

Most commands, even ones which require authentication, are transmitted without CMAC signature(s) or encryption. CMAC signatures from the reader to the card are not really used (except for writes to a file which specifies communication must be CMAC signed), ditto for encryption (although that one is used for key change operations, in addition to file writes on files that specify encrypted communication must be used). The vast majority of commands take a “plain” request from the reader, and return a CMAC signed response.

By my eye, this means that a malicious reader, or something otherwise capable of holding the card online after communication with an authentic reader is complete are able to execute privilaged commands (since one can simply ignore the CMAC signatures on responses), so long as the command doesn’t require the reader to provide CMAC signatures (or encryption), or allow the card to power down.

Fun with DESFire

I’ve played around a bit with ways to use the DESFire cards in interesting configurations, given what they’re capable of. Here’s some half-baked thoughts I had while mucking around with the cards – these are all poorly thought out sketches of some things we can do given the specific tradeoffs I see with the DESFire card. It’s also worth noting that I don’t have any of the actual documentation, and am not a cryptographic grown-up, so take these sketches with a massive grain of salt.

The first thing that came to mind when implementing this is how the authentication scheme can shift the boundary of what is and is not trusted (assuming good secure keying, and provided the key slots and card/application permissions are configured correctly). Rather than push the key material out to the machine connected to the NFC reader (“reader machine”), I instead tried turning the NFC reader and computer into something psuedo-untrusted by “merely” having it pass messages from the card to a trusted remote system (“remote machine”). This means that the “reader machine” is exchanging NFC data with the card, but that data is being decrypted, encrypted and processed by the trusted “remote machine” – the reader is unable to derive the session key.

For each of these, I wind up needing to authenticate – so there’s still a few latent risks, but these can mostly be mitigated by asking for a readbacks of any changed file(s), setting key permissions carefully, and requesting the card’s UID via the encrypted channel – all of which would require the symmetric secrets (which undermine the whole security model if comprimised).

This general construction is also subject to a hostile takeover of the untrusted “reader machine”, since most commands (including destructive ones!) are sent in “PLAIN” mode – the reader machine can wait until authentication is complete and then inject commands into the card and “simply” ignore the CMAC signatures on responses, severing ties with the remote machine. As such, we also need to take steps to ensure that the key being used is not one that allows any access beyond what is allowed. Here were some ideas I sketched out off the back of this theory.

The “second-factor”

Given some established (and authenticated) connection, part of the initial authentication flow may use the DESFire card to prove physical control over it as part of a handshake. This can serve as a second factor during some authentication flow, requiring physical card presence at a reader to fully initialize a connection. This does have one glaring downside, however – it’s phishable. To use this “for real”, we’d need to take some steps to prevent obvious MITM flows (XOR the NFC messages with the URI as seen by the client?), but maybe there’s something interesting there.

This also has a second interesting attribute – when used as part of a physical system authentication flow, this becomes a logical place to inject access control, being able to determine if some person is permitted to operate some device at that particular time (Is “Joe” current on his Laser Cutter certifications?) I think of the ideas I landed on, while conceptually interesting (using an employee id card as a 2FA token, it’s very fast), this one is the least likely to turn into something real.

The “encrypted-cookie”

This construction, when paired with an encrypted DESFire file, allows the “remote machine” to read/write an ’encrypted cookie’ to the card – storing small amount of encrypted data that the “remote machine” can read/write, but not the “reader machine”, since this uses an encrypted and authenticated channel from the “remote machine” directly to the DESFire card, without any intermediate hosts needing to be fully trusted. I keep calling this the “encrypted cookie” in my head because it feels conceptually similar to how Ruby on Rails and Laravel handles cookies.

We’d need to take a few extra steps here (for instance, ensure that you read the cookie back over the encrypted channel after writing to prevent a malicious reader from dropping writes) to secure the system, but it feels like the structure of this is definitely decent.

The “takeover”

This time, let’s say the computer attached to the NFC reader (“reader machine”) is semi-trusted. For this scheme, our trusted “remote machine” and the “reader machine” pass messages over the network to handle authentication to the card (as above), where the handshake data is being decrypted, encrypted and processed by the trusted “remote machine” as usual. However, once the authentication handshake is complete and a session key has been derived, the “remote system” return the session key to the “reader machine”, giving it a one-time-use key and authenticated session to the card.

We need to be careful about global/application permissions and key access control to files – but in this construction, we can allow the “reader machine” to take over privileged actions using a scope-limited DESFire key without handing over the card’s true keying material (preventing cloning of the card). This can be helpful to ensure messages to/from the card are truely from the card (verifying CMAC signatures), enables the “reader machine” to directly read/write to/from encrypted file(s), but allows the symmetric key material to remain in as few places as possible – which is critical given compromising that secret will undermine the security of the entire system.

Heads up, Debian IKE/IPsec users.

Starting with strongSwan 6.1.0-1 (currently in Debian unstable and targeted at Debian 14 Forky), the IKEv1 protocol has been disabled. This is aligned with upstream decision. Considering IKEv2 is already nearly old enough to drink in the USA (RFC 4306 will turn 21 next December) and IKEv1 has weaknesses, the disabling is long overdue amd will permit upstream to remove some code in the upcoming years.

At this point there is no good reason not to migrate to IKEv2 and exposing IKEv1 code in all Debian installation is no longer relevant. All IKEv1 users using Debian 13 Trixie (either site to site, gateway or roadwarrior client) should investigate IKEv2 protocol (or other options).

Note that some plugins have also been disabled upstream for security/maintenance reasons and we followed suite in Debian. The Debian relevant ones are: af-alg, led, padlock.

Debian Contributions: 2026-08

Contributing to Debian is part of Freexian’s mission. This article covers the latest achievements of Freexian and their collaborators. All of this is made possible by organizations subscribing to our Long Term Support contracts and consulting services.

Replacing lxc with Incus for Debian CI, by Antonio Terceiro

At the beginning of this month, the default backend for tests was changed to incus-lxc, leaving only a few dozen packages explicitly configured to run as lxc. Those packages got bug reports filed and once those bugs are fixed they will be migrated over to incus-lxc. This marks an important milestone for Debian CI, as the low level of isolation between the worker host OS and the OS under test when using lxc was a significant source of instability in our platform. Common causes for test failures when comparing runs under plain lxc with runs with incus-lxc are documented in the wiki page linked from the bug reports.

security-tracker git performance, by Helmut Grohne

Developers working with Debian’s security-tracker have reported degrading performance for a while. The options for solving this are few with repository sizes now reaching 30GB for a repository whose working tree is a mere 60MB. While there have been a number of proposals for changing the storage layout, Helmut evaluated options not requiring such changes. Much of the problem hinges on the 50MB data/CVE/list file that is updated in most commits. Efficiency hinges on representing its content in git packs.

Practically, git frequently fails to represent its content as a delta and stores a full copy that is typically compressed to 12MB. Add a few thousand 12MB full blobs and you quickly have a large repository. In particular, the copy at salsa.debian.org stores many such full blobs, so pulling from it consumes significant bandwidth.

One might think that running git gc helps, but its utility is limited here. When git stores objects in packs, it stores the history in reverse. It starts with the current version and represents older objects as differences (deltas) to more recent objects. A delta effectively is a sequence of copying ranges from a base object and insertion of new content. Given that humans tend to add content over time, those additions are often represented as deletions. The crux here is finding that base object. Given that the data/CVE/list file is large, finding it involves comparing quite a few versions of it with each other. This requires both a significant amount of RAM and CPU time. How many objects git considers for this comparison is controlled with the --window option. It is beneficial if the base object does not come from a direct child commit but skips over commits. In doing so, long chains of deltas are avoided. The --depth option controls the maximum chain length.

In this search, git combines all objects into a single window to facilitate file renames. As such, it tends to compare data/CVE/list with data/DSA/list, data/DLA/list and others. This is less than helpful and tends to evict all data/CVE/list versions from the comparison window such that a new full blob of it becomes required. Since the security-tracker repository rarely renames files, we can ask git to instead consider one window per filename via --path-walk. Once doing so, it becomes quite a bit better at finding suitable deltas. The technique is less applicable to older history (2025 and earlier), but given a lot of RAM and a bit of partitioning, git gc can shrink that as well. Combining these techniques, we can shrink the repository into 700MB and keep new growth somewhat under control.

Temporarily, Helmut is providing a proof-of-concept mirror at git://git.subdivi.de/~helmut/security-tracker.git using these techniques. Avoid pulling from it directly as it does not provide a secure transport. While it does reduce the amount of data being downloaded, it does not resolve a number of related problems. After downloading, a git client will still expend considerable amounts of CPU on verifying received deltas and attempting to git blame data/CVE/list is not improved in any way. Still, there is work on integrating some of the improvements back into salsa.

OpenSSH GSS-API split, by Colin Watson

In an option review Colin did in 2024, shortly after the xz-utils backdoor, he explained that having GSS-API authentication and key exchange support in the main OpenSSH packages is problematic. The key exchange patch is large and intrusive. Even linking to the necessary libraries isn’t without risk: as the Ebury malware attack demonstrated way back in 2009, each extra library linked into security-critical daemons such as sshd (or nowadays into its privilege-separated helper programs) can modify the behaviour of the daemon even if you aren’t doing anything that would involve calling into that library. Of course some of that risk remains, but as Damien Miller wrote, minimizing the number of libraries that end up in the address space of sshd and friends is still valuable.

This split is now complete in testing. As of openssh 1:10.4p1-5, the OpenSSH client and server are built without GSS-API authentication and key exchange support. If you need those features, install openssh-client-gssapi or openssh-server-gssapi instead, as appropriate. Debian 13 (trixie) already has packages with those names that just depend on the regular openssh-client and openssh-server so that you can pre-emptively install them, as documented in the release notes.

The new openssh-*-gssapi packages have relatively tight dependencies on openssh-common, in order for the testing migration system to ensure that we can’t forget to keep them up to date. This will mean a bit more ongoing work on each new upstream version, but it should be manageable.

Catching up on DebConf video publication, by Stefano Rivera

DebConf 25 videos suffered terribly from a bug in voctomix that stopped us from being able to publish the videos immediately after the conference. Ivo De Decker did some work on the videos earlier this year, fixing enough of the audio problems to make the videos at least intelligible.

While at MiniDebConf Winterthur Stefano published all the videos from 2025 and 2026 to PeerTube and YouTube. DebConf 25 and DebConf 26 videos as well as all the videos from miniconfs that had got caught up in the backlog were published.

Miscellaneous contributions

• Carles used po-debconf-manager to review and submit Catalan translations for six packages.
• Carles prepared a prototype of building webwml and running “tidy” (linter) in Salsa.
• Carles created different webwml merge requests with different fixes: invalid links to different architectures, 404s to external sites, fixed templates with invalid URL to favicon.ico, making USE_SAMPLE_FILES=1 to avoid fetching external files, typos in English, etc.
• Carles updated the LibreOffice Wiki page.
• Emilio managed several transitions, such as glibc 2.43, perl 5.42, kdepim, nginx, gnome-desktop 51, python3.14-only, and many others.
• Emilio updated libxfont to 2.0.9, xorg-server to 21.1.24, xwayland to 24.1.13, and fixed a FTBFS bug in terminator.
• Antonio deployed the website for MiniDebConf Beijing 2026, and archived the Hamburg 2026 and Kanpur 2026 MiniDebConf websites.
• Antonio released auto-apt-proxy 18, adding new features and fixing bugs; that needed a followup 18.1 release to fix an issue identified in the testing migration tests.
• Antonio did several Salsa maintenance tasks, including his first platform security update and investigating an issue that was causing the background tasks to be severely delayed, imparting the site usability.
• Thorsten tried to fix some bugs in hplip and cups. Unfortunately this did not result in an upload this month, but stay tuned!
• Helmut continued to report undeclared file conflicts and correspond about them.
• Helmut reviewed and merged Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues’ work on adding hurd support to debvm.
• Helmut fixed a pile of minor issues in the support libraries underpinning unschroot.
• Helmut adapted rebootstrap to archive regressions and improved its handling of non-default gcc versions.
• Helmut fixed the rendering of decompressed logs at crossqa.debian.net.
• Helmut sent patches for two cross build failures.
• Colin deployed the fix for Invalid link rel=“canonical” on bugs.debian.org. In the process he found a few bugs in recent undeployed code and fixed them.
• Santiago continued helping Aryan Karamtoth with the GSoC project on introducing livepatching support for linux. Several challenges have been identified in the recent couple of months, and Santiago is trying to guide Aryan to address them and design the solution. The mentoring is done in collaboration with Emmanuel Arias.
• Lucas onboarded a co-maintainer for Valkey.
• Lucas has started to work on a draft for the Debian Outreach project for onboarding newcomers interested in Debian packaging via a video course.
• Stefano worked on the after-math of DebConf 26, handling the bursary expense reimbursement process and winding down the conference finances.
• Stefano uploaded Python 3.15 RC 1 to Debian unstable.
• Stefano did some budgeting and travel planning for the DebConf 27 site-visit in Asahikawa, Japan. The DebConf committee sends a couple of members to meet with the local team and view the venue together, in advance of the next DebConf.

The Reproducible Builds project relies on several projects, supporters and sponsors for financial support, but they are also valued as ambassadors who spread the word about our project and the work that we do.

This is the ninth installment in a series featuring the projects, companies and individuals who support the Reproducible Builds project. We started this series by featuring the Civil Infrastructure Platform project, and followed this up with a post about the Ford Foundation as well as recent ones about ARDC, the Google Open Source Security Team (GOSST), Bootstrappable Builds, the F-Droid project, David A. Wheeler, Simon Butler and Kees Cook.

Today, however, we will be talking with Jochen Sprickerhof, one of the newer members of the Reproducible Builds project core team.

Vagrant Cascadian: Could you tell me a bit about yourself? What sort of things do you work on?

Jochen Sprickerhof: I am a freelance programmer working on Open Source. Mainly doing Debian, F-Droid and some smaller software projects. In general I made it a habit to look into every software I use and try to fix bugs or add features I need. In Debian, I maintain about 180 packages with topics covering home banking, build systems and robotics. Most of my time, I currently work on reproduce.debian.net, where we try to bit-for-bit reproduce the packages distributed by Debian.

Vagrant: Could you describe the path that lead you to working on reproducible builds?

Jochen: I started my Debian journey as a teenager, converting my school to Debian and serving as its system administrator for 13 years. After studying Applied System Science, I joined the university’s robotics labs, where I worked on the Robot Operating System (ROS) and the Point Cloud Library (PCL). In the end, I enjoyed programming more than writing papers, so I eventually left academia for a robotics startup. Some years ago, I realized that the open source work I was doing in my spare time was actually the work I cared most about. Nowadays I am really grateful that I can spend my days working on things I find important and have lots of fun with.

Vagrant: What projects did you recently make big progress on?

Jochen: A recent example is metasnap.debian.net. It is a ‘meta archive’ of snapshot.debian.org which is itself archive of all packages in Debian. But let me explain it the other way round: with reproduce.debian.net, we try to reproduce the packages as they are distributed by the Debian archive. For that, we need the same build environment (compilers, libraries, build tools, etc) that was used by Debian back when the original package was compiled. Luckily, snapshot.debian.org has all those packages, but they are not easily accessible via apt, Debian’s package manager. So, metasnap provides a mapping from a package name and version pair to the APT repo on snapshot.debian.org needed to download it from. It was created by josch some time ago, and it’s awesome work. But when we tried to reproduce more and more packages on reproduce.debian.net, we found that some were missing packages from the build environment — even though they where visible on snapshot.debian.org. We found that metasnap excluded some archive areas because they where not expected to be needed. Reimporting all the data took more than two months and surfaced a couple more flaws.

With this fixed, we were able to build more packages, only to find out that metasnap also needs better support for version numbers. Luckily we were able to rewrite the data in a day instead of starting the import again.

Vagrant: You have been working on infrastructure to support reproducible builds for a while. Has recent adoption of reproduce.debian.net into the Debian release tooling changed the focus of your work?

Jochen: Quite a bit. When we started reproduce.debian.net in 2024, only around 33% of the packages could be reproduced successfully. Today we are above 98%. Most were not bugs in the packages themselves but in the infrastructure. Similar to the metasnap issue I reference above, packages just needed a rebuild because something else, like the toolchain, was fixed in the meantime. In May, people from the Debian release team and the Reproducible Builds project sat together and decided that the overall state is good enough, and now packages that regress on reproducibility are blocked from entering the next Debian release. But that does not mean all the work is on the shoulders of Debian package maintainers. Since then I have been constantly looking at the migration tooling to spot regressions and provide fixes. Furthermore, a couple of maintainers reached out to us for help and I hope more will do so in future.

Vagrant: What is one small thing you (or others) have not yet gotten to that you would really like to see?

Jochen: The central tool to reproduce Debian packages is debrebuild, also written by josch. Currently it has two ways to retrieve the build dependencies of a package. Either it uses metasnap.debian.net (as explained above), or it can access the Debian unstable APT repository directly. This allows to test packages locally before everything is indexed on metasnap by compiling against Debian unstable. But actually there are many other APT repositories to query, like Debian stable or even derivatives. Adding support for an optional list of APT repositories in debrebuild would be great. That would also be a big step to support reproducing other Debian based distributions.

Vagrant: … and one big thing?

Jochen: It would be great to integrate metasnap.debian.net into snapshot.debian.org. There is some discussion on it already in Debian bug #650783.

Vagrant: What are the tools you use the most?

Jochen: According to my fish shell history:

$ history | cut -d' ' -f1 | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head -10
  36199 git
  20941 vi
  12271 rm
   8599 cd
   7917 ls
   6407 apt
   5631 grep
   4249 mv
   3655 dpkg
   2873 cp

Vagrant: So, is the fish shell reproducible? I remember it did not used to be…

Jochen: You can check for yourself — it was last time I checked. But looking through the other commands, neovim sadly is not. I hope we can fix that in future.

Vagrant: Oh, that’s a nice URL to check for reproducible package… you can just pass the source package name to check the current results?

Jochen: Yes. Another one is udd.debian.org/reproducibility/, where you can list all packages of a Debian maintainer. It also lists source reproducibility and has nice filters as well.

Vagrant: What tools do you use specifically working on reproducible builds?

Jochen: I don’t have statistics for that, but I would say sbuild to build the package, debrebuild to reproduce it, and diffoscope to analyze the differences. Obviously I also need run apt source <package> or use git-buildpackage to get the sources and all the tools I mentioned above.

Vagrant: So how many packages are left to build reproducibly, and once those are finished, what is next?

Jochen: Right now, reproduce.debian.net shows over 98% reproducibility, though there are still over 650 package left and some will probably need a lot of work. But actually I think making packages reproducible is just the first step. For me, this is a project to build confidence in the system. To reproduce a package we have two parts: the source of the package and the build environment. Fixing the packages means gaining confidence in the first part but we still rely on the individual build environments for each package as we need to use the same compiler that was used when the package was build initially. Because of this, we have to keep around every historical version of all toolchain packages. I really would like to remove this extra archive, which means we would have to rebuild all of Debian around release time. I am dreaming of a Debian release where you could bit-for-bit reproduce every package just from the released versions. Due to how Debian works, however, this is not a trivial rebuild and it would need some work on the infrastructure. By the way, initially there was a third component to pay attention to: any connection to the outside world during the build. Luckily we fixed the Debian build daemons to not allow network connections during the build some time ago.

Vagrant: Thanks for all that work, and taking the time to tell us a bit about yourself!

Jochen: Thanks a lot for the interview!

For more information about the Reproducible Builds project, please see our website at reproducible-builds.org. If you are interested in ensuring the ongoing security of the software that underpins our civilisation and wish to sponsor the Reproducible Builds project, please reach out to the project by emailing contact@reproducible-builds.org.

I asked the banker who is my reference at the bank something like this:

Give that we are talking about the consequences of the tantrum of a fascist foreign government, what happened to them (who are also people close and dear to me), in some future can very well happen to me.

Suddenly my risk profile shot up under the roof.

What do you suggest me to do? Should I find a trusted source of gold bullions to bury under the cellar at home?

The answer was something like this:

Sadly YES, given that the USA have a sort of financial monopoly they can entitle themselves to arbitrarily define a person/organization as a terrorist without any trial or judicial course, and as a consequence apply sanctions that cannot be effectively counteracted, not even abroad.

I didn't have this in my 2026 bingo card, but here we are.

For more details, see:

• the A/I press release under "12. Banca Etica: the sanction also affected an Italian bank account"
• the public statement from the bank (in Italian)

For some broader context on this kind of actions from the USA, see also:

• The same sactions against UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese
• Executive Order 14203 titled "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court"

After having witnessed how easy it is for good people to lose a .org domain over a fascist tantrum (you can follow the Autistici/Inventati story here and here), I've started moving all my infrastructure to differently managed TLDs.

enricozini.org and enricozini.com will keep being functional for the time being, as dropping a domain makes it available for squatting and impersonation.

These new domains are now online, with working web and emails:

• enricozini.eu
• ezini.eu
• ezini.it (probably equally subject to fascist tantrums these days)

It will take ages to migrate countless accounts that are tied to my primary email address, so better start early.

Waiting to see what will happen with .meow domains, which I supported despite not identifying as a cat.

A new version 0.0.7 of the td package for accessing the twelvedata API for financial is now on CRAN, and has been built for r2u.

This release combines the standard set of maintenance changes that accrue in a four and a half year period (!!) as that much time has past since the previous release. But it also contains two contributed functions to retried, respectively, a profile (available under a paid plan) and a set of main fundamental data statistics, both provided Kenneth Rose.

The NEWS entry follows.

Changes in version 0.0.7 (2026-09-13)

• Added fun_statistics and fun_profile function

• Expanded README.md with additional badges, and updated URLs

• Updated continuous integration multiple times

• Switched to Authors@R

Thanks to CRANberries, you can also look at the most recent diff to the previous release. See the project page, the github repo, and the package documentation for more details.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub.

The third release (in twelve years !!) of the sanitizers package is now on CRAN. sanitizers provides ‘true positives’ for programming errors detected by the Address Sanitizer and friends such as the Undefined Behavior Sanitizer. This permits validation of the setup when chasing such bug reports: it allows us to ascertain that the compiler (and instrumented R version) are correctly set up and the errors we expect to be reported are in fact reported. That established, a proposed fix no longer exhibiting that same error will then likely be a suitable one.

A very good resources for all things sanitizers is the Google repo at GitHub and especially its wiki.

A little over twelve years since the first release, and three years since the second one, this update brings chiefly internal package changes and maintenance. No functional changes, no behavioural changes.

The brief NEWS entry follows.

Changes in version 0.1.2 (2026-09-12)

• Expanded README.md with additional badges, and updated URLs

• Updated continuous integration multiple times

• Switched to Authors@R

• Added usage, arguments and value sections to manual page

Thanks to CRANberries, you can also look at the most recent diff to the previous release. See the project page, the github repo, and the package documentation for more details.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub.

Welcome to the August 2026 report from the Reproducible Builds project!

In our reports, we try to outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. As a quick recap about what problem our project intends to solve, whilst anyone may inspect the source code of free software for malicious flaws, almost all software is distributed to end users as pre-compiled binaries. The motivation behind the reproducible builds effort is to ensure no flaws have been introduced during this compilation process by promising identical results are always generated from a given source, thus allowing multiple third-parties to come to a consensus on whether a build was compromised or not.

In this month’s report, we cover:

1. New updated SBOM specification from CISA.gov
2. LWN on Bootstrappable builds at FOSSY 2026
3. ”What’s missing to have reproducible builds on PyPI?”
4. Distribution work
5. Unreproducible builds under EROFS filesystem fixed
6. Tool and documentation development
7. Six new scholarly papers
8. Patches

New updated SBOM specification from CISA.gov

CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the U.S. government published some the joint guidance entitled Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), which updates and supersedes the baseline 2021 version covered in previous editions of these reports.

Whilst the PDF is worth skimming, the interesting changes include that the specification now mandates standard cryptographic hashes: unlike earlier standards that allowed hash omission or manifest-only parsing, hashes must be computed from the output. This is is important for reproducible builds, as it ensures the recording of the metadata required to demonstrate the shipped software matches the build output precisely where applicable. In addition, where the top-level only dependency limitation that was present in the 2021 version has been removed in favour of complete coverage with no minimum depth. That is, SBOMs are expected to reflect all linked libraries, vendored dependencies and other build-time inclusions.

LWN on Bootstrappable builds at FOSSY 2026

In the “Toolchains and Other Development Tools” track at Software Freedom Conservancy’s FOSSY 2026 in British Columbia, Canada, Timothy Sample gave a presentation on bootstrappable builds. This presentation was then covered in a Linux Weekly News article by Jake Edge entitled Bootstrappable builds: how and why, which serves as an excellent introduction to the concept:

The basic idea behind bootstrappable builds is to create a system that can be built without relying on pre-built artifacts. “Can we go from zero to the modern day without having to just assume the existence of these already-built-for-us artifacts?” The classic recipe for yogurt requires some yogurt to start the process, which is like how we normally build a C compiler today—we start with an existing C compiler binary. You might think about making sourdough bread with your grandmother’s starter brought over from the old country; “we’re basically making C compilers with Dennis Ritchie’s starter carried over from Bell Labs”.

The article, which goes on to cover GNU Mes and other projects that overlap with Reproducible Builds, also has a number of thought-provoking comments.

”What’s missing to have reproducible builds on PyPI?”

Core Python developer, Brett Cannon wrote an interesting blog post this month addressing What’s missing to have reproducible builds on PyPI, the official public repository for third-party Python software packages:

The reason I like the idea of making reproducible builds work is that I think it can be done in such a way as to not require any work on the part of the producer of a distribution (which is a technical term for sdists or wheels, i.e., the people who upload stuff to PyPI), and thus make reproducible builds very low-friction for people to opt into supporting. […]

Brett goes on to outline “What’s missing from the specs” and how reproducibility might be visible on PyPI to consumers:

Assuming all of this comes to pass and we record the where the source code is that went into a distribution and the software used to make the distribution, how do we make it useful to people? Does every person who cares about having a secure supply chain have to rebuild everything they use themselves? Is there some way for even people who don’t care about this stuff to benefit? […]

Distribution work

In Debian this month, 23 reviews of Debian packages were added, 28 were updated and 27 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. A number of issue types have been updated as well, such as the addition of a new toolchain issue related to python-traitlets […], and the note for an existing issue related to texi2html was updated as well […].

Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another openSUSE monthly update for their reproducibility work there.

Unreproducible builds under EROFS filesystem fixed

Martin Pitt reported on Fosstodon that they had identified an issue where the mkfs (“make filesystem”) command for the EROFS (Enhanced Read-Only File System) subsystem of the Linux kernel did not have sorted extended file attributes, leading to reproducible builds.

Thankfully, Martin also reported that they had fixed this in a commit to the kernel which “order[s] each inode’s xattrs by name so that images stay reproducible”. […]

Tool and documentation development

diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made a number of changes, including preparing and uploading versions 327, 328 and 329 to Debian. In particular, he ensured that diffoscope did not require python3-guestfs in the autopkgtests on 32-bit architectures in order to fix Debian bug (#1144372) […]. Colin Watson made an additional change, handling a potentially missing openssh-client package when running the autopkgtests […], and Jochen Sprickerhof made a similar change to cope with missing cpio and qemu-img functionality […] whilst also updating the XML comparator to be considered when comparing SVG images […].

Yet again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month as well. For example:

• Chris Lamb added draft for a Gothenburg summit-related news article. […][…]

• Holger Levsen then published the same article. […][…]

• Lastly, a large number of commits were pushed comprising an interview with Reproducible Builds developer Jochen Sprickerhof to be published within the next week. […][…][…][…][…][…][…]

Six new scholarly papers

Jens Dietrich, Spencer Sun, Tim W. White and Behnaz Hassanshahi (the result of a collaboration between Victoria University of Wellington and Oracle Australia published a paper this month entitled No Snake Oil: Verifying Python Package Builds. Drawing on the metaphor of “snake oil”, that is, a fake or ineffective medicine or solution sold with exaggerated claims of curing or fixing everything, the authors write that

Two tools that are designed to automate [PyPI] rebuilds and run them at scale are macaron and oss-rebuild. We study 12,180 popular releases from PyPI and find that the byte-for-byte equivalence rate is generally low. We analyse the reasons why they produce different wheels, and find that equivalence between the original and rebuilt wheels can often still be established, preserving most of the guarantees users expect from rebuildable releases. We present and evaluate daleq4py, a tool to establish the equivalence of Python wheels through the kernel of a normalisation function that is based on provenance-preserving datalog rules. Experimental results show that daleq4py substantially expands the set of rebuilds that can be accepted as equivalent.

The full PDF of their paper can be viewed online, and Jens Dietrich to our mailing list to announce the availability of both the paper and the daleq4py tool itself.

Dimitri Kokkonis, Michaël Marcozzi and Stefano Zacchiroli published an article this month titled Not In My Git Yard: Catching Backdoors at Commit and Release Time on the topic of “code-level backdoors” — that is, “stealthy code changes that grant hidden privileges via secret triggers”. These issues:

… pose a persistent threat to opensource software. Known attempts to inject such backdoors into widely used projects through malicious commits, tampered release packages, or compromised third-party dependencies, were stopped only by luck and manual review. Existing Continuous Integration (CI) pipelines cannot detect these attacks, and downstream binary analysis tools require substantial manual effort. In this work, we present Lily, an automated approach that strengthens open-source development and release processes against backdoor injection. Lily integrates a backdoor detection mechanism into (1) CI pipelines to block malicious commits, and (2) release vetting workflows to prevent tampered releases or compromised dependencies from entering large ecosystems, such as Linux distributions.

The full PDF can be read online.

Ranindya Paramitha and Laurie Williams of North Carolina State University along with Christian Kästner of Carnegie Mellon University published a paper this month with the title of The Software Supply Chain as a Market for Lemons: A Multivocal Review of Trust Signal Collapse. (A “lemon” in American English, is a vehicle that “turns out to have several manufacturing defects”.) Their abstract is as follows:

Practitioners evaluating open-source dependencies rely on cheap trust signals, e.g., stars, download counts, and contributor activity, as substitutes for direct code inspection, assuming those signals reflect genuine trustworthiness. Prior work has documented individual signal gaming, but the landscape of collapses across all dependency-adoption signals, as well as the ecosystem’s response, remains unexplored. The goal of this study is to aid software practitioners in understanding the reliability of dependency adoption trust signals, such as download counts and contributor activity, by conducting a multivocal review of 252 Google Search sources and 870 Reddit threads.

Worryingly, after their review, the authors conclude that “cheap trust signals collapse under three simultaneous forces: adversarial manipulation, gaming techniques indistinguishable from legitimate behavior, and non-adversarial AI-driven inflation.”

The full PDF of the paper is available online.

Julien Malka, Aman Sharma, Martin Monperrus, Stefano Zacchiroli and Théo Zimmermann published a paper this month on Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution through Binary Manipulation:

Ken Thompson’s trusting-trust attack, in which a compromised compiler backdoors the programs it builds and reproduces the backdoor in subsequent rebuilds of itself, is widely regarded as a threat specific to compilers. We show that it is not. We construct a complete trusting-trust attack around GNU strip, an ordinary build utility that neither inspects nor generates source code, using only manipulations of finished ELF files.

Scarily, in the authors’ example, “a single tampered strip in the binary seed implants a payload that propagates from one generation of strip to the next and survives into the final standard environment after the seed leaves the dependency closure […] without failures and backdoors”.

A full PDF of the paper is available for download online.

Mehdi Keshanimm, Amirhossein Rahmati, Mohammad Hossein Aref and Abbas Heydarnoori published a paper that is currently under review at Emperical Software Engineering titled AROMA+: A Study of Factors Affecting Reproducible Builds in the Maven Ecosystem. (Maven is a/the build automation tool used for Java projects.) In their paper, the authors note that

[…] reusing external software in a project presents a security risk when the source of the component is unknown or the consistency of a component cannot be verified. The SolarWinds attack serves as a popular example in which the injection of malicious code into a library affected thousands of customers and caused a loss of billions of dollars. […] Our research aims to support [reproducibility] efforts in the Maven ecosystem through automation. We investigate the feasibility of automatically finding the source code of a library from its Maven release and recovering information about the original release environment. Our tool, AROMA+, can obtain this critical information from the artifact and the source repository through several heuristics and we use the results for reproduction attempts of packages on Maven Central.

The full PDF of their article can be downloaded online.

Lastly, Oreofe Solarin, Kelechi Kalu, James C. Davis and Paschal Amusuo published a paper this month titled Reproducibility is Not Enough: Artifact Verifiability in Decentralized-Build Package Ecosystems:

[A]rtifact verification requires more than deterministic builds: a verifier must also recover the source state, build environment, dependencies, and build instructions that produced the artifact. Decentralized-build ecosystems make this difficult because artifacts are produced through heterogeneous tools, maintainer-controlled workflows, and fragmented metadata. As a result, it remains unclear how often artifacts in these ecosystems can be independently verified. This paper studies artifact verifiability across four popular decentralized-build package ecosystems. We define an independent verifier model that relies only on registry-derivable metadata and an artifact comparison model with tiered equivalence levels. We implement these models in an Artifact Verification Pipeline and use it to measure artifact verifiability across the target ecosystems.

The authors conclude that “beyond build determinism, verifiability is limited by missing source and build metadata, implicit release transformations, and unconventional build practices”.

A PDF of their paper can be reviewed online.

Patches

The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where applicable or possible. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

• Bernhard M. Wiedemann:

  • Botan
  • Rivet
  • boost
  • ceph
  • cosmic/xdgen
  • cpio
  • dmd
  • dvgt
  • efl
  • firefox-esr
  • fritzing
  • gcc/esbuild
  • git-annex
  • go1.27/esbuild
  • gputils/sdcc
  • grass
  • gri
  • java-21-openj9
  • java-25-openj9
  • ksh
  • llvm22
  • llvm
  • llvm
  • lutgen
  • maxima
  • mingw64-filesystem
  • neochat
  • obs
  • python-PyMuPDF
  • python-gguf
  • python-langgraph
  • python-pook
  • python-pyzmq
  • python-xgrammar
  • python-xlsx2csv
  • qt6-tools
  • sbcl
  • scons
  • virtualbox
  • xpenguins
  • zabbix

• Chris Lamb:

  • #1143615 filed against keychain.
  • #1143616 filed against python-nameparser.
  • #1143617 filed against lcov.
  • #1144065 filed against displaycal-py3.
  • #1144066 filed against redmine.
  • #1144407 filed against django-htmx.
  • #1144409 filed against pybdsf.
  • #1145914 filed against golang-github-adamkorcz-go-fuzz-headers-1.
  • #1145915 filed against googletest.

• Jochen Sprickerhof:

  • #1145443 filed against cross-toolchain-base.
  • #1146088 filed against ferret-vis.

• Robin Candau:

  • bashburn
  • LMMS

• Werner Fink:

  • bash

If you are interested in contributing to the project, please visit our Contribute page on our website.

Two weeks ago, I released AppStream 1.2.0. This release contains a lot of great changes, but one of the most important ones concerns how media are being handled, and AppStream’s default image export format.

AppStream is a Freedesktop metadata standard to describe software components. That can be anything from system services over fonts to console and graphical applications. AppStream metadata is supposed to give users enough information to decide whether they want to install a piece of software, to represent that piece of software, and to give the operating system enough information to decide whether a software component should be installed automatically and (to some extent) what capabilities and relations it has, to provide the user with sensible options.

Especially for the first two goals, and especially for GUI applications, AppStream supports icons and screenshots, which are used to showcase applications. Today, AppStream is used by all kinds of services, from Linux distributions over firmware updates to Flatpak and desktops directly. AppStream’s original design however comes from the perspective of Linux distributions in 2011, where you may want to browse the software catalog offline, without delay, and without pinging an external server (which could be a privacy concern).

Therefore, a common way to deploy an AppStream-enabled software repository is to ship all icons of all applications in the repository to the user as part of the repository metadata download. AppStream does support remote icon downloads nowadays, and for a while I thought that this would become the default eventually. However, especially in today’s world, having a bandwidth-saving, instantly responsive, privacy-protecting application browsing experience seems more important that ever.

PNG images are great!

The only format that AppStream supports for icons and screenshots (which are downloaded on-demand from your distributor’s CDN) has always been exclusively PNG. PNG images are perfect for icons, because they compress well (especially for common icon shapes), are fast and simple to load, and can be loaded anywhere, by any toolkit or webbrowser. They also ensure we deliver faithful screenshot images, even though we may have scaled or re-rendered them. Still though, PNG images are less great for screenshots, as they are not very efficient, which puts strain on any CDN that has to deliver them, as well as on people’s internet connections when browsing screenshots. Having smaller thumbnails alleviates that problem a little, but does not fully solve it.

But even for icons, PNG could be improved upon: In many cases, icons are re-downloaded with the repository metadata again and again, so having a large icon tarball adds up to the data transferred during metadata refreshes. AppStream also now supports large 128x128px icons, which nobody in 2012 expected we would need, adding even more data that will be re-downloaded. Saving some space here translates directly to lower bandwidth costs as well as faster downloads for users.

To improve PNG file sizes, the AppStream Compose library, which handles all image processing and metadata catalog composition, was running optipng on all generated PNG images. That does create smaller PNG images, but they were still relatively large compared to other image formats.

For a long time though, there was no alternative to PNG images for icons: There was no lossless image compression format that could give us the same quality as PNG images and that was also widely supported.

JPEG-XL vs PNG in AppStream

Since 2021 we have JPEG-XL (JXL), which offers a true lossless mode with often better compression than PNG. The issue was that JPEG-XL wasn’t widely supported. Then, in 2025, the PDF Association selected JPEG-XL as the preferred image format for HDR images in PDFs, and now we are finally getting browser support and more ubiquitous availability of the format (you can try it right now in Firefox!).

For screenshots, using JXL’s lossy mode, it has obvious and extreme size advantages over PNG, so supporting JXL or WebP for screenshot images was an obvious choice. If JXL would support the lossless case very well as well though, we could serve many use cases with the same exported image format, which is very attractive to me.

So, the obvious next question was whether it was worth the pain of switching the icon format, so I did some measurements on real icons. For that I used the AppStream component icon pool that Debian Unstable ships, which is almost 5000 application icons of various sizes, and converted them to PNG:

PNG images saved with libpng at effort=4, compression=9, then optimized using optipng -o2, JXL images encoded using vips jxlsave lossless=1 effort=7 strip=1 via VIPS/libjxl.

As the table shows, using lossless JXL images over size-optimized PNG images (using optipng’s default settings) provides a roughly 20% gain. This does not look like much, until you consider how often these files are downloaded: A 20% file size reduction may only save 1-2 MiB of disk space, but if they are downloaded over and over again by many clients, it will save a lot of bandwidth.

Interesting JXL encoding findings

As a sidequest, I was curious why some images were larger than their PNG counterparts when encoded with JXL, and what the ones that were significantly smaller were.

In short, the biggest size reductions for JXL existed on images that were already small as PNG, and contained large, flat color surfaces with hard edges and simple shapes. They were not very interesting, and much of JXL’s wins come from accumulating smaller gains across all files, which compound the bigger icons get (especially at 128x128px, where JXL truly shines).

The events were JXL loses to PNG are more interesting: For example, it does quite poorly with pixel-art images that have a lot of repeating patterns. Those are encoded well by PNG, but less efficiently by JXL. Take for example Vonsh:

Icon of Vonsh, an SDL-based snake game, which PNG compresses better than JXL

My guess is that while PNG can exploit the repeating pixel patterns for compression, JXL’s predicts surrounding pixels from its neighbours, which fails too often and makes it pay almost full entropy per pixel. In this single rare case, the PNG is at 5.4 KiB, while the JXL is almost 8 KiB in size.

Other cases I looked at were arguably buggy input data, where color channels were hidden under the alpha channel of the input image. PNG could probably again exploit repeats, while we were forcing JXL to encode pixels that were invisible in the final image. This is arguably a problem with the original input data. Currently, AppStream does not make any changes to icons at all, but in future we might add a filter that removes invisible colors from images to solve this pathological case (it was only two icons out of 5000 though, so it is not a high priority).

The third case I found where JXL loses to PNG were icons with checkerboard-like patterns:

Icon of x3270, an IBM 3270 Terminal Emulator

For those, PNG can likely again exploit the repeating patterns, while a checkerboard layout is pretty bad for left/top predictors like JXL’s. However, in this case the size difference (and loss for JXL) is only 450 bytes, so even though JXL loses to PNG, it does so not by much.

JXL in AppStream

Given these findings, JPEG-XL is the default image format starting with AppStream 1.2.0. AppStream Compose will encode all images losslessly as JXL, while screenshots are encoded in lossy mode at Q=90 effort=7. Since the optipng step does not happen for JXL images, this comes at no speed penalty and is even a bit faster on modern x86_64 CPUs (where libjxl can use SIMD). PNG is still available, and Compose can be told to switch between the two formats.

Upsides of JXL in AppStream right now

If you use JXL in Compose or the recent release of appstream-generator, you will get much smaller images and, for screenshots, will benefit from other JPEG-XL features such as progressive decoding, providing a far nicer user experience. libAppStream has supported JXL icons since version 1.1.3, so your clients will need that version or a newer one, and all software centers will have to support loading JXL images (which all of them do, provided the right plugins are installed).

Downsides of switching to JXL too quickly

JXL is a very new format, so web browsers might not yet display it if you are serving webpages. Your clients may also have bugs in processing JXL images, as the format is still “new”. For example, switching on JXL in Debian sent KDE Discover into an infinite loop on startup while trying to load the icons (an issue which has been fixed, but clients will need that patch first before JXL is switched on).

This currently makes JXL enablement only possible when you know that your clients can support it. This is the case for me in Debian Unstable and Debian 14, which are using JXL images for a few weeks now, but not for any older releases. Platforms like Flatpak have it even harder, because they do know even less about their clients. So, even though it has big advantages, you may want to hold off on using JXL right away, and force PNG by setting the ImageFormat key to png in appstream-generator‘s configuration, or passing --image-format=png to appstreamcli compose.

It is also worth mentioning that JPEG-XL is much, much slower on systems that do not have SIMD instructions or for which the libjxl/jxl-rs library does not have them (such as apparently riscv64 right now). If this is a concern, you might not want to switch to JXL right away.

Media pipeline improvements

Besides the JXL default change, AppStream 1.2.0 also comes with a complete overhaul of its media processing pipeline. While libappstream, AppStream’s main library, does not do any media processing and comes with very minimal dependencies to be embedded in client applications and used on servers, the same can not be said about libappstream-compose, AppStream’s library to build metadata generating applications (the server-side part, usually).

The compose library has to render fonts into font specimen cards, inspect translation files, render SVG images, decode all kinds of raster images, inspect video files, etc. Especially the fonts, and the fact that fonts can appear in SVG images, has caused issues in the past, as libappstream-compose is a heavily threaded library and most font libraries can only work from a single thread. This forced the library to essentially go into single-thread mode anytime anything that could touch a font was being processed.

AppStream also originally was created for a “safe world” where applications were vetted by the distributors before their metadata was processed. This is increasingly not the case, so it made sense to put at least a few guardrails on the most complex part of the pipeline: The media processing. As part of the change, media processing was split out into a separate worker process. This solved two problems at once: Font handling was isolated in a single-threaded binary – if we wanted to handle fonts in parallel, we could simply spawn more workers. And, being in a separate process, the media processing could now be sandboxed.

As part of the multiprocess changes, Compose also switched from using GdkPixbuf to VIPS for image processing. The latter allows for much more fine-grained control over the image output and encoding, and comes with a lot of well-maintained filters and operations, which made it possible to eliminate a fair chunk of AppStream’s hand-rolled image processing operations. As part of this transition, we unfortunately lost the ability to read XPM images, which dropped about 20-30 applications from the pool at Debian. But in the name of security, this is a sensible choice, especially since most XPM icons were very small and low-resolution, and applications using them could benefit from adding a high-quality PNG icon anyway. With VIPS, we also now restrict the amount of image formats we can load to a sensible set, so extremely niche or unexpected formats will be outright rejected (this includes sane-but-unusual formats for screenshots and icons, such as TIFF images).

The Compose library, with all of these changes, will now just request high-level operations (e.g. “render a font card for this font to a JXL image”) from the worker, and provide it with input data in sealed memfds and output locations as FDs as well. On Linux systems, the worker will use Landlock if available, to block all write access to the filesystem, deny device access and deny TCP and UDP as well. The sandbox can certainly be tightened a fair bit in future, but this was a good and safe start to gain some experience with it without having things break too easily, given the many places Compose is used in (also, Landlock’s API is surprisingly nice to use, so it was easier than I thought to add in this early version).

With all of these changes, the libappstream-compose library is now also officially marked API-stable, so you should be able to rely on it in future to build new things (its API has barely changed in the past, and now with the new media API and defaults change in place, it was time to declare it stable).

I want to see / try this!

Currently, the easiest way to have a look at the new data is to check out Debian Unstable. If you have a JXL-enabled browser, you can also see the icons in AppStream Generator’s HTML pages for Debian Sid. If you are using appstream-generator for your distribution, you will also get much more pleasant statistics and HTML pages, as well as fully deterministic media output and a whole bunch of security updates, so, update to its recent 1.0 release.

Please keep in mind that if you switch to JXL, the client tools receiving the image data have to support it. Support varies depending on the Linux distribution, so, test it first and switch the default back to PNG in case you encounter any issues.

What’s next?

With so many features and changes landed, the next changes in AppStream will focus on improving what already exists and fixing any issues (there will be more blogposts about the other features 1.2.x delivers!). Testing with the entire Debian archive as data source makes me fairly confident though that there will not be many problems. In the longer term, tightening the media processing sandbox will also be something we might want to do, e.g. by hiding parts of the filesystem tree or filtering syscalls.

For JPEG-XL, one obvious question is “Will you add support for it to the Freedesktop icon-theme specification as supported format alongside PNG, SVG(Z), and XPM?”. For on-disk icon repositories, JXL’s space-savings are less compelling, and it being HDR-capable is also not necessarily a killer feature (PNG can go a long way!). However, JPEG-XL’s ability to immediately decode larger images at reduced resolution without resampling could legitimately be very powerful here, as applications could ship a single large image and quickly decode it at 1/2, 1/4 or 1/8 the size for different purposes in their UI. JPEG-XL also supports spot-color extra channels, which applications could use as masks to recolor raster icons at render time. This could be incredibly nice to color symbolic icons on-the-fly without any SVG and CSS. JXL also provides richer metadata, which might be neat for (license/author) documentation. So, the answer here is: Maybe it makes sense to allow another format, but this will have to be discussed first, as it would force JXL into every toolkit and desktop, which is a much bigger ask than supporting it only in AppStream.

As always, let me know what you think and please report any issues or bugs directly against AppStream or AppStream Generator if you encounter problems that are with the tools, and not with a project’s metadata.

An new maintenance version 0.2.8 of the random-number generator tester RDieHarder (based on the DieHarder suite developed / maintained by Robert Brown with contributions by David Bauer and myself along with other contributors) is now on CRAN and available via r2u.

This release contains only internal maintenance changes: continuous integration was updated a few times, newer nags from R are addressed in Rd files and the vignette, and we also updated a few URLs in the vignette and README.me. No new code, no new features.

Thanks to CRANberries, you can also look at the most recent diff to the previous release.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub.

There’s not a whole lot to report here. During August I spent some time on holiday and also had less work time available for Debian LTS.

• Debian packages:
  • firmware-nonfree:
    • Bugs:
      • replied to #1143446: firmware-nonfree: split Lontium firmware into a separate binary package
    • Merge requests:
      • closed !152: lontium: create new package containing firmware for Lontium display bridge devices
      • opened and merged !153: Update to 20260810
    • Uploads:
      • uploaded version 20260810-1 to unstable
  • linux:
    • Bugs:
      • replied to #1141407: linux-image-amd64: hid-generic 0003:051D:0002.0002: Event data for report 22 was too short (4 vs 2)
      • closed #1143619: linux-image-686: metapackage missing for 6.1.180-1 on 686 (LTS)
      • closed #1144056: linux-image-amd64: missing CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA384 causes IMA error
    • Merge requests:
      • merged !2039: Add support for Alcor Micro AU6625 PCI-E Flash card reader
      • merged !2041: Update to 5.10.262 (LTS)
      • merged !2042: 6.1 stable updates (LTS)
      • merged !2048: Update to 6.1.180 (LTS)
      • merged !2050: 6.1 stable updates (LTS)
      • reviewed !2059: [arm64] Enable CONFIG_SND_SOC_ES8328_I2C as module
      • reviewed and merged !2063: 6.1 stable updates (LTS)
      • merged !2068: 6.1 stable updates (LTS)
    • Uploads:
      • uploaded version 6.1.180-1 to bookworm-security (LTS)
      • uploaded version 7.1.7-1~bpo13+1 to trixie-backports
      • uploaded version 7.1.8-1~bpo13+1 to trixie-backports
  • linux-6.12 (LTS):
    • Uploads:
      • uploaded version 6.12.100-1~deb12u1 to bookworm-security
      • uploaded version 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 to bookworm-security
  • linux-base:
    • Merge requests:
      • merged !22: Also copy config file to /boot
      • merged !23: New hooks ignore all calls by unpackaged kernels
• Mailing lists:
  • debian-kernel:
    • posted Agenda items for kernel-team meeting on 2026-08-19
    • posted Opaque tables of numbers in r8169 driver
  • debian-lts-announce:
    • posted [SECURITY] [DLA 4720-1] linux security update
    • posted [SECURITY] [DLA 4724-1] linux-6.12 new package
    • posted [SECURITY] [DLA 4745-1] linux-6.12 security update
  • linux-input:
    • posted [PATCH] HID: core: demote warning to debug level

Just some notes about fixing some issues while installing Ubuntu on Macbook Pro 2017

Fix Audio

Audio is not working by default after a fresh install.

johndoe@mac ~> sudo apt install gcc linux-headers-generic make patch wget

johndoe@mac ~> sudo apt install linux-source-7.0.0

johndoe@mac ~/dev> git clone https://github.com/davidjo/snd_hda_macbookpro.git

johndoe@mac ~/dev> cd snd_hda_macbookpro/

johndoe@mac ~/d/snd_hda_macbookpro (master)> sudo ./install.cirrus.driver.sh


johndoe@mac ~/d/snd_hda_macbookpro (master)> sudo reboot

Fix Touchbar

> sudo apt install git dkms build-essential linux-headers-$(uname -r)

> git clone https://github.com/AJ-dev-i60/t1-touchbar.git
> cd t1-touchbar

> sudo ./install.sh
> sudo reboot

Fix Wi-Fi

Wifi actually works out of the box, but the signal strength is usually very bad. We&aposll try to fix that

johndoe@mac ~> cd /tmp
               wget -O brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt \
                     https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jsoyer/MacBookPro14-2/main/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt
--2026-09-10 18:36:39--  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jsoyer/MacBookPro14-2/main/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt
Resolving raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)... 185.199.109.133, 185.199.111.133, 185.199.110.133, ...
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)|185.199.109.133|:443... failed: Connection timed out.
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)|185.199.111.133|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 6051 (5.9K) [text/plain]
Saving to: ‘brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt’

brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt    100%[=====================================>]   5.91K  --.-KB/s    in 0.04s   

2026-09-10 18:38:53 (163 KB/s) - ‘brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt’ saved [6051/6051]



johndoe@mac /tmp> sed -i &aposs/^macaddr=.*/macaddr=<your-wi-fi-cards-mac-id>/&apos brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt


johndoe@mac /tmp> sudo cp /tmp/brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt \
                        "/lib/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac43602-pcie.Apple Inc.-MacBookPro14,2.txt"

johndoe@mac /tmp> sudo ln -sf \
                        "brcmfmac43602-pcie.Apple Inc.-MacBookPro14,2.txt" \
                        /lib/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac43602-pcie.txt
                     
                     
                     
johndoe@mac /tmp> sudo reboot

podlators is the package containing Pod::Man, Pod::Text, and other tools for converting POD documentation into manual pages and simple text documents.

This release fixes a long-standing bug in Pod::Text and subclasses where a pathological level of indentation could cause the wrapping code to go into an infinite loop. Thanks to Jitka Plesnikova for the report. This was assigned CVE-2026-82560, although I make no guarantees that podlators is safe to run on untrusted input and therefore not fully treating this like a security issue.

While fixing that bug, I noticed a bug in Pod::Text::Overstrike's wrapping code that would leave stray formatting at the start of the next line in some situations. That is also fixed in this release.

You can get the current podlators release from CPAN or from the podlators distribution page.

I’m looking at something entirely unrelated, but tripped over some search results that made me realise that a lot of people still think getting errors like ACPI Warning: SystemIO range 0x0000000000001828-0x000000000000182F conflicts with OpRegion 0x0000000000001800-0x000000000000187F indicate a firmware bug. This is generally untrue. We need to dive a little into what ACPI is to clarify why.

The Advanced Configuration and Power Interface¹ specification defines a whole bunch of stuff, but what’s interesting to us here is the hardware abstraction it performs. While PCs are nominally a well-defined platform that’s really not true at the hardware level once you get beyond a certain level of complexity. When you suspend a system you want to power down the hardware in the correct order, for instance, and knowing what that order is requires you to know details about the specific motherboard design. The approach taken in the embedded world is to just bake that knowledge into the OS in some form, which is how we end up with Devicetree. ACPI takes an alternative approach - rather than provide that information as data that has to be consumed by OS drivers, it distributes it as code.

The ACPI Source Language, or ASL, is a simple language that gets compiled into a bytecode that’s then interpreted by the OS at runtime. One of the features of this language is the ability to define “Operation Regions”, effectively structure definitions that describe access to underlying hardware. Let’s imagine a simple device with two exposed registers. The first is an index register - it describes which internal register we want to access. The second is a data register, where reading it gives us the value of the internal register whose address is currently in the index register, and writing to it modifies that register. An example operation region declaration would look something like

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OperationRegion(OPR1, SystemIO, 0x400, 0x2)
Field(OPR1, ByteAcc, NoLock, Preserve)
{
  INDX, 8
  DATA, 8
}

This defines an operation region called “OPR1” at IO port 0x400, 2 bytes long. Inside it are two 8-bit fields, INDX and DATA. These are to be accessed one at a time, do not need the ACPI interpreter to take a global lock when accessing them, and if a subset of the register is modified then the other values should be preserved (irrelevant in this case since the fields are only a byte wide). Now any references to INDX or DATA in this scope will trigger accesses to those registers. So, a method to read the value of register 0x03 would look something like:

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Method (RD03) {
  INDX = 0x3
  Return (DATA)
}

ie, set INDX to 3, and then read the value of DATA and return it. But! What if another ACPI method is running at the same time? Let’s say we have one that writes to register 0x05:

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Method (WR05, 1) {
  INDX = 0x05
  DATA = Arg1
}

What happens if RD03 executes while we’re part-way through WR05? INDX might get reset to 0x03, and now WR05 will modify register 0x03 instead of 0x05. Oh no! But we can avoid this - we declare a mutex (Mutex (MUTX, 0x00)), and update our methods to be something like:

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Method (RD03) {
  Acquire (MUTX, 0xFFFF)
  INDX = 0x3
  Local0 = DATA
  Release (MUTX)
  Return (Local0)
}

Method (WR05, 1) {
  Acquire (MUTX, 0xFFFF)
  INDX = 0x05
  DATA = Arg1
  Release (MUTX)
}

Each method takes a lock (waiting up to 0xffff milliseconds and then erroring out if it doesn’t), and performs the access. There’s now no chance of a race. Phew!

Now suppose someone writes a Linux driver for this piece of hardware. It accesses the hardware directly, with no knowledge of ACPI. What stops the driver from racing against one of the ACPI access methods? Nothing at all. Oh no! Again! This isn’t hypothetical, by the way - here’s a relatively harmless example, but back in the day we did trip over cases where temperature monitoring chips would be accessed by the firmware and Linux simultaneously and as a result you might end up thinking you’re reading a temperature when you’re actually reading a status flag, resulting in an impossibly high temperature and an immediate thermal shutdown.

In this case, the kernel saves you from this (potentially hardware damaging) outcome by printing a message like ACPI Warning: SystemIO range 0x0000000000000400-0x000000000000401 conflicts with OpRegion 0x0000000000000400-0x0000000000000401 (OPR1), telling you that the kernel has detected that a driver is attempting to allocate IO ports 0x400-0x401, but that there’s an ACPI operation region called OPR1 that is claiming the same addresses. The kernel isn’t in a position to know what type of access the firmware might perform in that region, so assumes that it might be dangerous and blocks the driver from loading.

But all is not lost! The kernel also prints some helpful advice, ACPI: If an ACPI driver is available for this device, you should use it instead of the native driver. And ACPI tables will often actually have a definition that looks like this:

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Device (HDW1)
{
  Name (_HID, "VEND0001")
  OperationRegion(OPR1, SystemIO, 0x400, 0x2)
  Field(OPR1, ByteAcc, NoLock, Preserve)
  {
    INDX, 8
    DATA, 8
  }
  Mutex (MUTX, 0)
  Method (RD03) {
    Acquire (MUTX, 0xFFFF)
    INDX = 0x3
    Local0 = DATA
    Release (MUTX)
    Return (Local0)
  }

  Method (WR05, 1) {
    Acquire (MUTX, 0xFFFF)
    INDX = 0x05
    DATA = Arg1
    Release (MUTX)
  }
}

which defines an ACPI device and associated methods. The _HID field defines the device type, and a Linux driver can be written that will be automatically loaded if a device with type VEND0001 is seen. That driver can then call ACPI methods associated with the device and access the resources in a way that matches the firmware’s expectations.

(Interested in writing such a driver? I wrote a guide back in 2009)

The firmware did absolutely nothing wrong here², but trying to load the native driver will generate an error and the internet will tell you that PC firmware developers are incompetent³ and you should pass a kernel argument that overrides this behaviour and it never did them any harm, and it probably won’t do you any harm either but it might and you might never know why your system occasionally wedges or catches fire.

A new maintenance release 0.0.7 of RcppXts is now on CRAN, and has been built for r2u. The RcppXts package demonstrates how to access the export C API of xts which we contributed a looong time ago. There are by now a more example packages around this C level access to another package, but this one was an early example.

This release is strictly maintenance, updating continuous integration, the README.md file and other packaging conventions adopted since the last release four years ago.

The NEWS entries follow.

Changes in version 0.0.7 (2026-09-09)

• Corrected a docstring for the module

• Updated continuous integration setup several times

• Simplified setup by removing no-longer-needed Makevars

• Added badges to README.md

Courtesy of my CRANberries, there is also a diffstat report for this release. For questions, suggestions, or issues please use the issue tracker at the GitHub repo.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub.

Debian LTS/ELTS

This was my hundred-forty-sixth month that I did some work for the Debian LTS initiative, started by Raphael Hertzog at Freexian.

Unfortunately the number of distributed working hours had been rather low this month, so the list contains much less entries than normal. During my allocated time I uploaded or worked on:

• [DLA 4713-1] sslh security update to fix one CVE in Bookworm related to a so-called “link following” vulnerability.
• [DLA 4714-1] libmodbus security update to fix one CVEs in Bookworm related to a stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability.
• [DLA 4715-1] kissfft security update to fix two CVEs in Bookworm related to integer overflows.

Last but not least I spent days with FD work at the beginning of the month. The last remaining hours I continued to work on cups and hplip. Unfortunately this work did not result in an upload yet.

Debian Printing

This month I did not upload any package but just worked on some bugs.

This work is generously funded by Freexian!

Debian Lomiri

This month I worked on new Lomiri Apps. Due to a broken disk, the progress was not as expected. But stay tuned!

Not really related to Lomiri, but to Debian EDU, I fixed an incus related bug in sitesummary.

This work is generously funded by Fre(i)e Software GmbH!

Debian Astro

This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of:

• … einsteinpy to unstable, fixing a dependency bug.
• … supernovas to unstable, sponsored upload of a new upstream version.

Debian IoT

Unfortunately I had no time to work in this category this month.

Debian Mobcom

This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of:

• … libosmocore to unstable.
• … osmocom-analog to unstable.
• … libosmo-netif to unstable.
• … osmo-trx to unstable.
• … libosmo-abis to unstable.
• … libosmo-sigtran to experimental.
• … osmo-mgw to unstable.
• … osmo-bsc to experimental.
• … osmo-sgsn to experimental.
• … osmo-pcu to unstable.
• … osmo-hlr to unstable.
• … osmo-tetra to unstable.

misc

This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of:

• … tango to unstable to fix bugs and do a soname transition.
• … pytango to unstable to fix bugs and do a soname transition.

Armadillo is a powerful and expressive C++ template library for linear algebra and scientific computing. It aims towards a good balance between speed and ease of use, has a syntax deliberately close to Matlab, and is useful for algorithm development directly in C++, or quick conversion of research code into production environments. RcppArmadillo integrates this library with the R environment and language–and is widely used by (currently) 1331 other packages on CRAN, downloaded 48.5 million times (per the partial logs from the cloud mirrors of CRAN), and the CSDA paper (preprint / vignette) by Conrad and myself has been cited 727 times according to Google Scholar.

This versions updates to the 15.6.0 upstream Armadillo release made yesterday. It extends solver options for poorly conditioned systems, and brings some updates and extension to the cube data type. For this release, we once again ran the usual complete reverse-dependency check which came back spotless, and did CRAN so no email exchange needed despite nearly 1300 reverse dependencies (but it ended up taking more than a single business day). Still, automation can be helpful when used with a well-maintained software stack. The package has also already been updated for Debian, built for r2u and r-universe, and will build shortly at CRAN for the different binary releases.

All changes since the last CRAN release follow.

Changes in RcppArmadillo version 15.6.0-1 (2026-09-07)

• Upgraded to Armadillo release 15.6.0 (Medium Roast Cortado)

  • Expanded solve() with solve_opts::scale_thresh option to widen detection of poorly conditioned systems

  • Expanded trans() and .t() to handle cubes

  • Added permute() to rearrange dimensions of cubes (generalised transpose)

  • Added cubemul() for batched matrix multiplication of cube slices

Courtesy of my CRANberries, there is a diffstat report relative to previous release. More detailed information is on the RcppArmadillo page. Questions, comments etc should go to the rcpp-devel mailing list off the Rcpp R-Forge page.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can sponsor me at GitHub.

The final step to all of this was to tie together all my PHY RF code, Link layer parsers, and my background with operating systems to make this all feel like a normal thing my computer should be doing.

At the end of the day, I want my host system to know how to talk with a pigeon daemon, so I don’t have to reimplement basically everything else. My ability to use normal tools like curl or ping6 is pretty important here, so I need to reach for my old friend, the TUN interface. The TAP/TUN interface allows the kernel to route ethernet frames (TAP) or ip packets (TUN) to a userspace program responsible for handling delivery and reception – avoiding the need for a kernelspace driver for something that can be handled in userland.

I’m no stranger to playing with TAP/TUN, so this was pretty easy to snap together – although this time I avoided the whole ethernet proxying thing (to side-step lossy translations, maintaining two sets of mac address tables, and handle proxying NDP/ARP messages) – it was kinda a bad idea last time – so I just used TUN and straight IP for now. While implementing this, I decided I’d make a key assertion about all pigeon networks – namely, all pigeon IPv6 networks are a /64 in size, no more, no less. The reason why I’m doing this here is that, since pigeond does still does need a MAC address for the pigeon layer 2 protocol, we can write our daemon to always use SLAAC to set the TUN IP address without any new information.

Which leads us to a bit of an aside, but I have a point, I swear. A few years ago, my recreational RF adventures have lead me down a path where I decided to engage with ARIN to solve (once and for all) the massive headache I was running into with IPv6 numbering (really: always renumbering) my multi-site radio processing networks. It’s a lot of work to keep running correctly, but it’s solved a huge amount of problems for me.

The only “internal” thing we really need to outline for this post is that, at the highest level, my network (paultag.net) is split into an IP plan that looks roughly like:

For this exercise, I used IP space from paultag.net’s experimental region (“region 8”), named side.band (2602:810:6008::/48) to connect my RF lab (“site 1” - 2602:810:6008:400::/54), and my two pigeon-specific subnets, “subnet 0” (2602:810:6008:400::/64) and “subnet 1” (2602:810:6008:401::/64) to my wider network. The first subnet (“subnet 0”) is a simple ethernet network to enable my RF-only nodes to communicate with the side.band gateway. The second subnet (“subnet 1”) is an RF-only pigeon network local to my lab.

back to radios

With all that set up, I assigned my first two nodes their MAC addresses, and set up the local RF only network segment. The nodes I brought online were the following:

testing the pigeon network

And with that, I could begin to test that the host operating systems and RF links could properly exchange data locally from SDR to SDR. We can use ping6 to see if a plain-ole ICMPv6 ping round trips between hosts correctly:

$ ping6 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001
PING 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001 (2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=426 ms
64 bytes from 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=397 ms
64 bytes from 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=419 ms
64 bytes from 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=418 ms
64 bytes from 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001: icmp_seq=5 ttl=64 time=436 ms
64 bytes from 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001: icmp_seq=6 ttl=64 time=391 ms
64 bytes from 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001: icmp_seq=7 ttl=64 time=397 ms

And it does! Latency is horrid (and there’s a bunch of tx artifacts that cause issues for us) – but both of those things are problems for later. Let’s see how it handles a TCP connection by firing off a quick cURL across the Pigeon network:

$ curl http://[2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001]:8000/testing.txt
The rock dove (Columba livia), also known as the common pigeon or rock pigeon
(but see also Petrophassa), is a member of the bird family Columbidae (doves
and pigeons).

As expected, our “remote” end here running the server reports the correct peer IP address, which is another indication (beyond the log messages and blinking LEDs) that we’re routing over our TUN interface.

Serving HTTP on 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001 port 8000 (http://[2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4001]:8000/) ...
2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4002 - - [28/May/2026 12:53:21] "GET /testing.txt HTTP/1.1" 200 -

That … worked? First shot! Nice! It’s pretty slow and seems like we have a lot of packet loss, but it does, however, beg the question – can it nethack?

nethack!

Yes! It can nethack! No clickbait here. The way I went about this one is a bit anit-cimatic – I set up a nethack server (using inetd in this case) on one of the hosts’ pigeon0 network interface, and hit that port over RF from the other:

However, when playing it, it becomes very obvious (as you can likely see) that there’s a fair amount of packet loss (understandable) and probably some packet collisions taking place.

iperf

Let’s try and put a number to exactly how bad the bandwidth and packet loss is by running iperf between the two pigeon hosts over rf:

$ iperf -c 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4002
------------------------------------------------------------
Client connecting to 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4002, TCP port 5001
TCP window size: 16.0 KByte (default)
------------------------------------------------------------
[ 1] local 2602:810:6008:401:: port 58248 connected with 2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4002 port 5001
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bandwidth
[ 1] 0.0000-20.2348 sec 76.8 KBytes 31.1 Kbits/sec

Shockingly, not nearly as bad as I thought it was going to be. Given I’ve spent exactly zero time making this operate to a level that I would call acceptable, this is a very fucking solid start. I expect I could get that number up if I spent a few weeks on it – it’s just not been a priority at any point yet (and the first time I’ve instrumented it, even!).

This’ll be good enough to get started. Let’s see what else we can pull off here.

IP multicast to some rtl-sdrs

Back when I designed what I wanted Mode A to look like, I intentionally picked a signal bandwidth that could be received by an rtl-sdr – so let’s put that to use. It may go without saying, but just to say it – the rtl-sdr can not transmit, so this will be capable of receiving pigeon frames – but not sending any in reply.

However, this means I can use a bunch of low-cost computers (raspberry pi-class), and low-cost SDRs (rtl-sdr) and still receive IP traffic from transmitting pigeon network stations. This could be a lot of fun for things like fountain coding a data stream, or adapting multicast streaming protocols to work over RF links. Anywho, I swapped my “far” end to an rtl-sdr (one config file change!), and figured I’d start with some (basic) multicast traffic, transmitting the time once a second:

$ while [ true ]; do
 echo $(date +%s) \
 | socat - UDP6-DATAGRAM:[ff02::114%pigeon0]:62804
 sleep 1
done

If I had more time to burn, I was planning on bridging APRS traffic to UDP multicast within a pigeon network subnet. However, since I’m already 4 years late on this blog post, I figured this would be enough for now (and you can imagine that fun project in this space if you so wish!)

I fired up pigeond again (except this time connected to an rtl-sdr), and was pleasantly surprised to be greeted by some decoded traffic right off the bat:

⪧ [k3xec/mn] 8c:1f:64:35:40:02 ⇢ 00:00:00:00:00:00 ipv6 fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332 ⇢ ff02::114 17 (UDP - User Datagram)
⪧ [k3xec/mn] 8c:1f:64:35:40:02 ⇢ 00:00:00:00:00:00 ipv6 fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332 ⇢ ff02::114 17 (UDP - User Datagram)
⪧ [k3xec/mn] 8c:1f:64:35:40:02 ⇢ 00:00:00:00:00:00 ipv6 fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332 ⇢ ff02::114 17 (UDP - User Datagram)
⪧ [k3xec/mn] 8c:1f:64:35:40:02 ⇢ 00:00:00:00:00:00 ipv6 fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332 ⇢ ff02::114 17 (UDP - User Datagram)

Of course, I took a tcpdump to confirm for completeness sake that the traffic actually made it out of our TUN interface:

$ tcpdump -i pigeon0
22:39:34.808705 IP6 (flowlabel 0x92a0e, hlim 1, next-header UDP (17), payload length 19) fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332.35911 > ff02::114.62804: [udp sum ok] UDP, length 11
22:39:36.429887 IP6 (flowlabel 0x4dc84, hlim 1, next-header UDP (17), payload length 19) fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332.50026 > ff02::114.62804: [udp sum ok] UDP, length 11
22:39:39.365977 IP6 (flowlabel 0x224d5, hlim 1, next-header UDP (17), payload length 19) fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332.36308 > ff02::114.62804: [udp sum ok] UDP, length 11
22:39:40.944889 IP6 (flowlabel 0x4721c, hlim 1, next-header UDP (17), payload length 19) fe80::23ee:2969:53f7:b332.35003 > ff02::114.62804: [udp sum ok] UDP, length 11

Looks great! tcpdump is showing multicast packets show up (as we assumed they would), on the pigeon0 interface, on the machine connected to an rtl-sdr. Of course, any replies will get sent to the bit bucket, but it can definitely decode things just fine! Very fucking cool.

Well right, ok! Let’s go back to two rx/tx radios, and see what we can do with our newfound network stack over ham radio frequencies – let’s try to do some fun (and traditional!) ham radio things with it!

Winlink

Winlink is a ham radio mail relay system for ham radio operators to send, receive or relay mail over the internet, or RF (usually HF or VHF/2M). Winlink relays are accessible via whatever transport you can find – most commonly telnet (using the internet), ax.25 (usually 2m VHF) or VARA HF (unsurprisingly, on HF). I use pat as my Winlink client – it’s written in Go, doesn’t require windows, and is just generally nice to work with.

Let’s try the easy thing first – let’s connect by proxying the Winlink server into the pigeon network using socat (lightly edited to remove date/times)

$ pat connect pigeon
Connecting to WL2K (telnet)...
Connected to [2602:810:6008:401:8e1f:64ff:fe35:4002]:8772 (tcp)
[WL2K-5.0-B2FWIHJM$]
;PQ: 54509561
CMS>
>FC EM OLU6BP5HKMG2 240 205 0
>F> 95
FS Y
Remote accepted OLU6BP5HKMG2
Transmitting [Hello, World] [offset 0]
Hello, World: 100%
FF
>FQ
Disconnected.
$

Lo and behold, shortly after, I got this delightful message to my email address, relayed in from WINLINK:

From: K3XEC@winlink.org
Reply-To: K3XEC@winlink.org
Subject: Hello, World
To: paultag@[...]
Message-ID: <OLU6BP5HKMG2@winlink.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-MARSPrecedence: Routine
X-WL2KPrecedence: Routine
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Hello, World!

The only shame is I won’t be able to check in to a winlink wednesday using this scheme unless I further proxy this message over AX.25 instead of relaying to Winlink’s servers over telnet (which, to be fair, is definitely also possible – I just got lazy when I glued this one together – see note above about being 4 years late on this post).

But, you know, connecting to a host that is using socat to proxy a connection to an internet resource is interesting but – you know what, fuck it – hang on, dear reader – let’s bang a hard left turn and just ship this thing hard and directly connect it to the internet. Let’s take our dinky, home-built PHY and Layer 2 and see if we can wire it directly into the internet – something that, every time I go to think about it, reminds me of Tim FitzHigham and his crapper.

Crossing the english channel in a bathtub

Ok, ok. I decided to bury the lede a bit here – I didn’t mention that the side.band network is currently BGP announced. Although we haven’t used it – this does mean that we’re most of the way to sending packets to the wider internet, and we should be able to “just” fix a few routing tables, and see packets begin to flow.

After tweaking the local routing tables (and restarting pigeond for good measure), I decided to test my newfound connectivity by pinging something over our new network transport.

ping github

Why don’t we start with the world’s premier software engineering platform, operated by one of the largest companies in the world, GitHub! After all, they have an all knowing (and, apparently, arguably sentiant?) AI on hand to instantly and automatically fix any stray reliability issues in the background, so we should definitely see replies right off the bat:

$ ping6 github.com
ping6: github.com: Address family for hostname not supported

Wait, oh no – that can’t be right?

After all, it’s 2026, and both Google and CloudFlare (in North America) are reporting over half of all traffic they see is IPv6 – and GitHub still doesn’t support IPv6? Definitely not, this is for sure a bug with my code or network.

lets ping something that supports ipv6 instead

That being said, just for completeness sake, since that error is also given when there’s no IPv6 DNS record, let’s go ahead and double check with Hurricane Electric too, you know, just to be sure.

$ ping6 he.net
PING he.net (2001:470:0:503::2) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from he.net (2001:470:0:503::2): icmp_seq=1 ttl=53 time=514 ms
64 bytes from he.net (2001:470:0:503::2): icmp_seq=2 ttl=53 time=230 ms
64 bytes from he.net (2001:470:0:503::2): icmp_seq=3 ttl=53 time=248 ms
64 bytes from he.net (2001:470:0:503::2): icmp_seq=4 ttl=53 time=246 ms
64 bytes from he.net (2001:470:0:503::2): icmp_seq=5 ttl=53 time=265 ms
64 bytes from he.net (2001:470:0:503::2): icmp_seq=6 ttl=53 time=240 ms

Well, shit. Right, OK, i’ll be damned. 18 years in and GitHub still can’t crack that nut.

cURL works!

Right, anyway, yes, back on track – good news! Our uplink is up and routing, and wait, holy shit! Check it out! pigeon is exchanging packets with the internet and no one is any the wiser! Literlaly amazing. Let’s try a cURL across the internet now (although no TLS allowed, so, http only for now):

$ curl -6 -I http://facebook.com
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: https://facebook.com/
Content-Type: text/plain
Server: proxygen-bolt
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 0

IRC works, too

Sweeeeet. That all works! Forget HTTP, let’s do some other 90’s era stuff, it’s high-time to log into IRC with a quick /connect -notls, and see what’s going on in the #debian-hams channel – pleased that I got online fairly quickly, and was able to even talk to myself!

THE GOPHERSPACE

Naturally, let’s keep this train of nostalga running, and give the 2026 gopherspace a shot.

I know the kind folks over at tilde.town (hello, townies!) have a robust gopherspace, so let’s give it a dial! Let’s try and see if we can load vilmibm’s slug over gopher:

Yes! I forgot to make this one a video, so no gif. I did wind up having a bit if trouble with a few gopher clients and IPv6 support – I may send some patches if I can find the time.

So, what’s next?

Alright, that’s it. I have a few more fun ideas but they’re going to have to wait for another day. Carrying IP is fun and all but kinda not the point behind pigeon, after all. Rather than trying to make this into “a thing”, I’m planning on exploring the loose ends first – different types of modulation schemes (like QAM-NUC), implementing LDPC error correction and some layer 2 logic into the pigeond (like switching traffic, and gain control). I also plan on spending some time with my (currently, very basic) simulator to better dial in tradeoffs throughout the stack.

Since, structurally, pigeon is something I feel like I can work with, I’m hoping i’ll be able to find the time for some (much smaller!) followup posts without it taking 4 years this time. If I do, they’ll show up under the pigeon tag – and I’ll be sure to update this post with a link below (and the intro post).

I’m hoping that this series (which was supposed to be one post) was helpful to someone out there – if it was, feel free to reach out and let me know!

Built-in to the pigeon link protocol is a message type called cal (short for, you guessed it, calibration). A pigeon frame with a type of cal (which is 0x02) carries a JSON encoded payload in the body, which can either be a beacon, requesting signal reports in response, or a report, describing the received beacons.

This serves a few interesting purposes – firstly, network operators can better understand the coverage footprint, propagation under different conditions, and how gain impacts reception when tuning for the lowest practical power levels. Secondly, this can be used (and I plan to eventually implement!) to construct a mapping of minimum power level and peer mac address to dynamically control the transmission power based on the destination station.

That being said, for now, all I’ve used this for is getting a rough sense for what gain value(s) make sense between two nodes (manually). In the future, beyond all the fancy neighbor gain stuff, I plan to wire this into the daemon to happen automatically, “debouncing” for beacon and report messages, such that transmitting stations only beacon, and receiving stations only report a max of once over some time period for a given peer.

Version

Given all the above, I do intend to make some massive changes to this protocol (I promise to blog all about it) when I get around to hacking on switching Layer 2 frames within a network segment. Just to avoid having to dig myself out of a hole later, I’m going to explicitly send (and check) the version field to avoid having a big “flag day” switchover or needing to use a new link type.

Location

Both flavors of cal messages (beacon and report) may contain a location, which is the location that the beacon was transmitted, or for or the location where the beacon was heard for a response. This can be used to derive a coverage map and to (operationally) better understand what stations should be within range, and generally what gain level(s) are effective.

All fields assume WGS84 latitude and longitude values, and elevation is distance, in meters, above the WGS84 ellipsoid – NOT height above sea level, or altitude above the ground.

Sequence

Each beacon contains a Sequence identifier, which is used to communicate which message number is being heard, and how many total were transmitted by the originating station. The current approach with Beacon messages is to transmit some number of Beacon messages at different gain levels, each with a unique Sequence identifier.

Gains

Recorded gain setting(s). For a Beacon this indicates the gain settings (which, in spite of its name, includes things like amplifiers, or attenuators). Changing this over different Beacon frames enables a better understanding of what an appropriate gain level is for the transmitting station over time.

Cal

All messages contained in a cal frame are of this type. The type field communicates if this is a Beacon or Report message type.

Beacon

A beacon message may be sent periodically by pigeon nodes capable of transmitting to announce their prescience to peers and, implicitly, to receive signal reports from nearby listeners who are capable and configured to transmit reports.

The beacon JSON message is made up of the following fields:

An example beacon looks, unsupprisingly, as follows:

{
 "type": "beacon",
 "version": "V1",
 "sequence": {
 "number": 2,
 "total": 5
 },
 "gains": []
}

Report

A report message may be sent in response to a beacon message by pigeon nodes capable of receiving and transmitting to assist with setting the lowest usable gain value, and to better understand the area of coverage and propagation.

The report JSON message is made up of the following fields:

An example report looks as follows:

{
 "type": "report",
}

With all that out of the way

lets send some ip →

Now that we have a working Layer 1, we have a way to send a block of bits from one place to anyone who cares to listen to us. This is very welcome news, but we are now facing a new, different and just as fun question – what shape should that data take?

Given our incredibly limited functionality of our nodes, we could definitely skip all this work and just stuff an IP packet into the link; but I decided to not since I am (eventually) interested in adding some sort of spanning tree-like protocol to implement network switching so not all nodes need to communicate directly with all other nodes – but that day is not today.

Given i’m going to stub most of that out, let’s take a look at what some similar Layer 2 protocols use – things like Ethernet or WiFi frames. Both contain structured information regarding the transmitter, desired recipient, type of data, and the higher-level data itself (such as IP packets). As a result of attempting to learn from others, the Pigeon Layer 2 (called, simply, “link”) is also split into a fixed-length header, followed by the contents described by the header.

The header is a fixed-length (23 byte) structure, which contains the source MAC address (src mac), destination MAC address (dst mac), the ITU coordinated ham radio callsign of the control operator of this message (callsign), the type of payload to follow (type; defined below), and the length of the data to follow the header (length as a 16 bit big-endian unsigned integer).

The type field indicates how the payload is to be interpreted – currently I’ve only defined 3 possible payload types so far:

Keen observers will perhaps infer that there used to be an Ipv4 type at 0x03 – which is true – however, i’ve since removed it since i’ve never once used it and the codepath was more trouble than it was worth. As is my wont, I’ve optend to just lean into Ipv6-only IP transport – it’s easy enough to shim ipv4 in, if someone REALLY wanted to using something like 64:ff9b:1::/48 and a bit of code in the transmitter/receiver (or even using something like jool and unbound’s dns64-prefix at the router). I don’t think I’ll bring it back, but just in case I have to for some reason in the future, it’s there.

Additionally, friends of the pod may also recognize that this structure is basically the exact same structure as what I had in PACKRAT, which, is also true. I started this project off maintaining interoperability in the Layer 2 for pigeon and packrat, but at some point just gave up on it during one of the many cleanups. I’m hopeful I can maintain compatibility going forward, and that won’t have to muck with this header too much more. We’ll see what happens once I start to push the bounds of what is possible with pigeon.

Hopefully it feels like carrying IP data inside this frame to be a pretty self-explanatory exercise – the 0th byte of the payload is the 0th byte of an IPv6 header (followed by all the usual stuff, like UDP or TCP header(s) and any carried data, just like you’d find anywhere else.

Pigeon’s calabration protocol →

While developing Pigeon, I’ve called the group of all the configuration of the Layer 1 PHY parameters the “Mode”. I’ve experimented with a few different “modes”, but one in particular has been the most resilient to the innumerable mistakes and bugs i’ve wrought into existence – and that is the first mode I wrote down, “Mode A”. This is even (mostly) backwards compatible to my original Go implementation of Pigeon Mode A (back in 2022) over the air, and has largely withstood the problems I’ve thrown at it.

I’ve removed the bulk of the support I wrote out for other modes, but i’m likely to bring them back over time as I use pigeon to learn more (such as “Mode B” (QAM-16), “Mode C” (QAM-16 NUC), and “Mode AW” which is the exact same as Mode A, except 5MHz in bandwidth. More to come on those as I get further along – but for now let’s braindump the parameters i’ve picked out for Mode A:

The last bit to describe here is the Subcarrier Plan. The plan is ordered “negative first” (meaning the 0th bin in-memory is the most negative frequency domain bin of the fft), and within a Mode A OFDM symbol, there are 64 frequency domain bins (so, just to make it explicit: 64 ‘subcarrier usages’ that make up our Mode A ‘subcarrier plan’).

We’ll follow the same structure and conventions that we went through in the post all about OFDM Symbols – which means, we’ll need to place our guard bins, data bins, and pilot bins. I’ll include a copy-paste-able version of the images to follow at the end.

Guard Bins

First up, let’s place our guard bins. As we’ve already gone over, we’re looking to clear some space right up against the high and low end of the frequency range, so let’s go ahead and do that:

I gave up the center bin (0 Hz) and 8 of the 64 bits on each side (1/4 of the signal!) to give myself a bit of elbow room. This is perhaps definitely a bit overkill, but it’s been an extremely robust choice. If you multiply that through, this accounts for 312.5 kHz of frequency domain “padding” at the high and low end of the bandwidth, or 625.0 kHz of bandwidth which is not to be used.

Pilot Bins

Next up was the pilot bins. We’ve already gone over the purpose (and use) of our pilots, but I’ve found there to be an art to the placement of the pilots. Interpolation between pilot bins has turned out to be very reliable, but extrapolation, on the other hand, has been a major pain, for reasons I don’t fully understand yet.

My intent in placement was to pick out roughly even stretches of data bins bracketed between pilots, with as few data subcarriers as practical “outside” of a pilot (using extrapolation). I’ve played a bit with my AGWN simulator(s), as well as logging errors between two SDRs, and the configuration I have this in has been fairly resillant (for whatever reason), and withstood a few rounds of tweaking.

Data Bins

Almost as an afterthought – all of the remaining bins become data bins.

This puts the total number of data bins at 43, which, since Mode A carries data in QPSK/QAM-4 (two bits per data subcarrier), means we can carry 86 bits of data per OFDM symbol. That fairly modest capacity is largely due to the modulation scheme (or fft size, but increasing that has been … fraught) we’re using for Mode A – but I’ve made up for it by including 168 OFDM symbols in a single burst in order to have enough data to carry IP traffic without splitting the packet into two bursts.

With all that designed and on paper, we’re ready to start to tackle the next layer up – our Layer 2, named, creatively, “link”.

Let’s send some link layer data →

The following table is Mode A’s OFDM Subcarrier Plan. This is in negative first ordering (meaning the 0th member is the most negative fft bin, and the Nth is the highest frequency fft bin).

SubcarrierPlan([
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Pilot(iq!(-1.0, 0.0)),
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Pilot(iq!(1.0, 0.0)),
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Guard,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Pilot(iq!(0.0, -1.0)),
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Pilot(iq!(0.0, 1.0)),
 Data,
 Data,
 Data,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
 Guard,
])

The following table is Mode A’s frequency-domain preamble. This is, as above, in negative first ordering. I don’t actually think these values matter much (at all)? – but in case they do, here’s what I have. I muck with these a lot and haven’t found many changes in quality of detection or frequency correction yet.

[
 IQ::new(0.0, 0.0),
 IQ::new(0.0, 0.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 2.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 3.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 4.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 5.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 6.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 7.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 8.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 9.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 10.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 11.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 12.0, 1.0),
 IQ::polar((TAU / 13.0) * 13.0, 1.0),
 IQ::new(0.0, 0.0),
 IQ::new(0.0, 0.0),
]

Let’s send some link layer data →

The time has come.

If you’re following along at home, we now have all the basics we need to glue these parts together and see what this looks like.

We’re going to build the highest-level constructs for the PHY in code – something that takes some number of bytes in and writes out IQ samples fit for transmit over the airwaves (we’ll call this the Encoder), and something that takes chunks of IQ samples in, writing out decoded bytes (which we’ll call the Decoder).

Encoder

Let’s begin with the Encoder, since it’s slightly less involved. I’ve tried to make this a bit more accessible by drawing a diagram out before describing the order of operations, so that it’s possible to follow along visually.

While the process here can look like a lot, it’s really not that bad. We begin by taking the incoming bytes, converting the bytes into bits, and chunk those bits into parts which are sized to fit completely within an LDPC message. We will then encode incoming data into LDPC messages, using our configured LDPC Matrix (the table we appropriated from 802.3an). Next, we apply whitning over all the bits in our encoded (and packed) LDPC messages, using our configured whitening constant. In the case of QPSK, pairs of bits will then be modulated into a QAM subcarrier, where each QAM point represents a range of bits in the message. We’ll go through each of those modulated IQ subcarriers, and set each corresponding data subcarrier in order, for each OFDM symbol contained in the pigeon Burst. The preamble configuration is then used to generate (or, more likely, can be used at startup to precompute) the Schmidl-Cox preamble, which is written to the first IQ samples in our output IQ buffer. Finally, we will do a series of inverse FFT operations to convert each OFDM symbol to the time domain, including their cyclic prefix.

Let’s take a look at doing that, but in code this time now:

// (lightly edited for clarity)
impl Encoder {
 ..

 /// Encode the provided bits into the output time-domain IQ samples.
 fn encode(
 &mut self,
 dst: &mut [IQ],
 src: &Vector,
 ) -> Result<Burst, Error> {
 let src = {
 let mut raw = Vector::new(self.fec.message_len());

 // Set `raw`'s data bits, compute and set LDPC
 // checkbits.
 self.fec.add(&mut raw, src);

 // Apply whitening, and return
 raw.xor(&self.whitening)
 };

 // copy in the precomputed schmidl-cox preamble to `dst`
 let preamble_len = self.preamble_iq.len();
 dst[..preamble_len].copy_from_slice(&self.preamble_iq);

 // allocate a new (frequency domain) 'Burst' container.
 let mut burst = Burst::new(
 &self.mode.ofdm.plan,
 self.mode.ofdm.symbols
 );

 // modulate bits from 'src' as iq, and set each
 // data subcarrier for each ofdm symbol in the
 // burst.
 self.burst_encoder.multiplex(&mut burst, &src);

 // convert from frequency-domain data into time
 // domain iq samples, writing out ofdm symbols
 // and cyclic prefixes to `dst`.
 self.burst_encoder
 .transform(&mut dst[preamble_len..], &burst)?;

 // normalize all IQ samples; the maximum magnitude
 // in the IQ buffer may be very small, which weakens
 // our transmitted signal. Scale all IQ samples such
 // that the maximum IQ sample magnitude will be '1.0'.
 dst.norm();

 Ok(burst)
 }
}

Using the Encoder should hopefully be fairly straightforward – we’ll give it a bag of bytes, and get back some IQ samples that we can ask our nearest SDR to transmit.

As for what happens on the other end?

Decoder

Next up is the mirror image of our Encoder – the, imaginatively named, Decoder. The Decoder is slightly more involved (since it has to find the packet in the IQ stream, as well as correct for channel error(s)), so we’ll do the same thing as above – start with a diagram. My hope is going over the Encoder first helps us only really focus on the “new” stuff, otherwise it should feel like running the Encoder backwards.

Here, we start with an incoming stream of IQ, where we will process scan detections as they come in from our Schmidl-Cox detector and burst Scanner. This will give us a “snippit” of IQ, sized to exactly our Burst. We’ll begin to correct our IQ samples by first doing frequency estimation and correction in the time domain using our preamble and ofdm configuration. We’ll then do a series of inverse FFTs to extract each OFDM symbol in our Burst, where we can then do channel estimation and correction. With the OFDM symbols (hopefully) good enough, we can now map each data subcarrier back to bits, and unapply whitning. The resulting bits are then chunked back up into LDPC messages, which are then checked, and concatanated data extracted. Finally the bits are turned back into bytes, which are written to our output buffer.

However, before we get into the code to do this – there’s one last detail. We know bursts won’t overlap (if they do, it’s likely not possible to recover right now – even though other PHYs can and do), so any time we see something we believe to be a burst, we can skip ahead by the burst’s (constant) length within the IQ, and avoid trying to decode anything else in there.

The nice side-effect here is this also gives us an interesting property for the Decoder – namely, we know the maximum number of Burst detections we can get for a given block of incoming IQ data if they were packed end-to-end – and we can pre-allocate the memory we need, avoiding allocations for every demodulation attempt (which may or may not even be a valid Burst).

This pre-allocated block of memory to hold the burst’s data is something that I’ve called a frame buffer internally. Each frame buffer contains exactly sized buffers to hold decoded information from the burst – an iq buffer that is exactly the same number of samples required to encode the preamble and data, exactly the number of bits needed to store pre and post FEC data, pre-allocated byte array, etc.

Not shockingly, the code looks like this:

#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct FrameBuffer {
 /// Corrected IQ samples
 pub samples: Samples,

 /// post-correction OFDM burst
 pub burst: Burst,

 /// demodulated bits from the OFDM burst
 pub bits: Vector,

 /// demodulated bits from the OFDM burst,
 /// after FEC, and cleaned
 pub raw_bits: Vector,

 /// Layer 2 contents of the Frame
 pub contents: Vec<u8>,
}

Of course, that alone is handy – but we need to use them. So let’s go ahead and do what we promised above – each Decoder uses a fixed number of pre-allocated FrameBuffers to store packets in-flight, packed into what is, creatively, called FrameBuffers within my code.

As an aside, I likely should have called this a Memory Pool, since that’s the common and accepted name for this design pattern – but being stuck with unfortunate names is the burden of those of us who stumble into sensible ideas over time. The only nuance here is that I use the pools strictly sequentially – we only “save” the FrameBuffer if the LDPC checksum is correct, allowing us to only keep track of how many successful packets we have and being able to get the valid FrameBuffers, rather than storing a handle to each FrameBuffer as we go – a promise that most memory pools do not make, since blocks can usually be taken and returned in any order.

Let’s go ahead and do the whole Decoder dance now:

// (lightly edited for clarity)

impl Decoder {
 ..

 /// Process incoming IQ for Pigeon Bursts, and
 /// demodulate them.
 pub fn decode(
 &mut self,
 buf: &[IQ],
 ) -> Result<Vec<(Detection, &FrameBuffer)>, Error> {
 let mut ret = Vec::new();
 let mode = self.scanner.mode().clone();

 // reset the "valid frame buffer count" back to 0
 self.frames.reset();

 // call the scanner and get scan detections for
 // this block of iq (`buf`)
 for detection in self.scanner.scan(buf) {
 // for each detection, we're (only) going to process
 // the iq snippit, but pass along the metadata
 // such as SNR.
 let ScanDetection {
 snippit,
 snr,
 range,
 m,
 } = detection;

 // grab the next free frame buffer to work within.
 let frame_buffer = self.frames.next_mut();

 // Copy the snippit into the frame buffer (a mutable
 // location)
 frame_buffer.samples.copy_from_slice(snippit);

 // estimate the frequency offset based on the
 // Burst's Schmidl-Cox preamble.
 let preamble_fo = preamble::estimate_frequency_offset(
 &mode.preamble,
 mode.rate,
 &frame_buffer.samples[..mode.preamble.samples()],
 );

 // Shift the IQ stream by the estimated frequency
 // offset -- hopefully we're closer to 0Hz
 frame_buffer.samples.shift(mode.rate, preamble_fo);

 // estimate the frequency offset based on the
 // each burst's **cyclic prefix** -- exactly like
 // we did with the Burst Schmidl-Cox preamble,
 // but this time on each OFDM symbol.
 let ofdm_fo = ofdm::estimate_frequency_offset(
 &mode.ofdm,
 mode.rate,
 &frame_buffer.samples[mode.preamble.samples()..],
 );

 // Shift the IQ stream closer yet; hopefully this
 // is a very small nudge even closer still to 0Hz.
 frame_buffer.samples.shift(mode.rate, ofdm_fo);

 // Do a bunch of inverse fft operations for each
 // OFDM symbol, filling the frequency-domain Symbol
 // structs in `frame_buffer.burst` (Burst) struct.
 //
 // this will also do channel estimation and
 // correction before returning.
 self
 .decoder
 .transform(
 &mut frame_buffer.burst,
 &frame_buffer.samples[mode.preamble.samples()..],
 )?;

 // "demultiplex" each data subcarrier's frequency-domain
 // IQ constellation point, setting the correct bit range.
 self.decoder.demultiplex(
 &mut frame_buffer.raw_bits,
 &frame_buffer.burst
 );

 // unapply whitening by XOR-ing the buffer with
 // the well-known whitening vector.
 frame_buffer.raw_bits = frame_buffer.raw_bits.xor(
 &self.whitening);

 // verify that the LDPC message(s) are all correct,
 // and if so, concatanate the the data bits (no check
 // bits) to the `bits` vector.
 if self.fec.decode(
 &mut frame_buffer.bits,
 &frame_buffer.raw_bits
 ).is_err() {
 // this is where invalid packets fail. we gave it a good go.
 // next packet please.
 continue;
 }

 // copy the raw bits out, as bytes, to the `contents` buffer.
 frame_buffer.bits.copy_as_bytes(&mut frame_buffer.contents);

 // store metadata/metrics on the demodulation.
 ret.push(Detection {
 m,
 snr,
 index: range.start,
 });

 // save the contents of this frame buffer (don't
 // reuse this buffer next go-around).
 self.frames.save();
 }

 // We're going to take out the borrow on the frame at
 // the end since we don't want to deal with telling the
 // compiler via code gymnastics that the mut and non-mut
 // borrows are OK since they're non-overlapping.
 Ok(ret.into_iter().zip(self.frames.iter()).collect())
 }
}

Phew. That was kinda a lot. In fact it’s basically the whole thing. This function is as close to “how do you read an OFDM packet” as it gets, and perhaps the most important part of this whole series. Beyond that, though, this is a huge conceptual unlock. This means we now have an incredibly powerful primitive; the ability to take bytes and go to/from IQ samples over the air.

Let’s talk about pigeon modes →

I asked the banker who is my reference at the bank something like this:

Give that we are talking about the consequences of the tantrum of a fascist foreign government, what happened to them (who are also people close and dear to me), in some future can very well happen to me.

Suddenly my risk profile shot up under the roof.

What do you suggest me to do? Should I find a trusted source of gold bullions to bury under the cellar at home?

The answer was something like this:

Sadly YES, given that the USA have a sort of financial monopoly they can entitle themselves to arbitrarily define a person/organization as a terrorist without any trial or judicial course, and as a consequence apply sanctions that cannot be effectively counteracted, not even abroad.

I didn't have this in my 2026 bingo card, but here we are.

For more details, see:

• the A/I press release under "12. Banca Etica: the sanction also affected an Italian bank account"
• the public statement from the bank (in Italian)

For some broader context on this kind of actions from the USA, see also:

• The same sactions against UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese
• Executive Order 14203 titled "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court"

The following contributor got their Debian Developer account in the last two months:

• Nicolas Peugnet (nicolasp)

The following contributors were added as Debian Maintainers in the last two months:

• Antoine Lassagne
• Ivan Hu
• Jesse Rhodes
• Haolin Xue
• Léo Haf
• Rony João de Sousa
• Luke Yasuda
• Darshaka Pathirana

Congratulations!

My Debian contributions this month were all sponsored by Freexian.

You can also support my work directly via Liberapay or GitHub Sponsors.

Personal note

This month, my Dad unexpectedly passed away after a short illness. As a result I obviously got less work done than usual, and I still have a lot to take care of (since I’m the executor of his will, as well as helping with funeral arrangements) while grieving and generally having less focus and energy. Having routine work to do is one of the ways I cope with this sort of thing, but all the same, I hope people will bear with me and maybe remind me if I seem to be dropping the ball on something you especially need.

LLM vote

[Content note: strong opinions.]

I voted in General Resolution: LLM usage in Debian. My vote was pretty much the opposite of what ended up winning, so I’m quite disappointed. My personal opinion is that LLMs are cognitive hazards to their users that impose ecological costs far out of proportion to their utility at a time when the world absolutely cannot afford them. When the impossible economics of the large commercial models are finally allowed to catch up with reality, I expect there to be significant macroeconomic consequences, and that people who have become dependent on them will have problems; and who knows what the copyright situation on their output really is. I’m not convinced that local models are better enough on these axes to be worth the costs.

Debian’s direct contribution to all that will be negligible on a global scale, and even the most radical proposals in the GR didn’t expect that we could do much about upstreams that have gone all-in on LLMs. Even so, I’d hoped that my fellow developers might be more willing to lean on our position in the free software ecosystem to make at least a moderately radical statement. Instead, we’ve at best presented an undistinguished fence-sitting position to the world, and further entrenched the idea that humans can reliably do a good job of reviewing the output of tools that are designed to produce output plausible to humans. I certainly don’t trust my own code review skills that far.

Since I’ve never voluntarily used an LLM (not counting LLMs being foisted on me by things like search results, support chatbots, or incoming pull requests, regardless of whether I asked for them), and don’t intend to for the foreseeable future, I doubt this will change much for me in terms of the way I work. The winning option is a very weak one that imposes no new requirements on developers, which means that it also does nothing to stop me continuing to reject LLM-generated material from Debian bug reports and merge requests in my areas of responsibility. I know this probably won’t do much to satisfy people who have decided that Debian is slop now, but it’s the best I can do.

OpenSSH

I finally landed the GSS-API key exchange package split in our OpenSSH packaging. Here’s the NEWS entry:

openssh (1:10.4p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium

  The openssh-client and openssh-server packages no longer include GSS-API
  authentication and key exchange support; this adds pre-authentication
  attack surface and generally increases complexity, and should only be used
  where specifically needed.  Users who need these features should install
  openssh-client-gssapi or openssh-server-gssapi instead.

 -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 23 Aug 2026 17:39:55 +0100

I fixed a flaky autopkgtest.

I upgraded from 10.4p1 to 10.5p1, which was a good test of keeping openssh and the new openssh-gssapi source package in sync.

PuTTY

I upgraded from 0.84 to 0.85.

Python packaging

New upstream versions:

• anorack
• djangorestframework (fixing a build failure)
• isort
• lazr.delegates (dropping pkg_resources)
• lazr.restfulclient (dropping pkg_resources)
• lazr.uri (dropping pkg_resources)
• nbclient (fixing a build failure)
• pydantic-settings
• python-argcomplete
• python-blockbuster
• python-makefun (fixing a build failure)
• python-persistent
• python-pytest-run-parallel
• python-time-machine
• python-typing-inspection
• wcwidth
• zope.hookable
• zope.i18nmessageid
• zope.interface
• zope.proxy
• zope.security
• zope.testrunner

The version treadmill continues: we’ve just finished dropping Python 3.13 as a supported version, so now we’ve started working on enabling Python 3.15 as a supported version. Maximiliano Curia has been very helpfully driving this. I didn’t get as much done here as I’d have liked (see the top of this post), but I fixed a couple of packages:

• pydantic
• python-typing-extensions

Other build/test failures:

• anorack
• buildbot
• codespell
• django-prometheus
• pendulum
• pydantic-core
• python-argcomplete
• python-ast-serialize
• python-bcrypt
• python-cross-web
• python-datamodel-code-generator
• python-djangorestframework-flex-fields
• python-openapi-core
• python-treq
• scikit-build-core

I fixed some other bugs:

• python-librosa: Hardcoded Python 3.13 in rules file
• python-makefun: Fails to build source after successful build

bugs.debian.org

I deployed the fix for Invalid link rel=”canonical” on bugs.debian.org. In the process I found a few bugs in recent undeployed code and fixed them.

I am a heavy user of sidenotes:¹ they keep optional content next to the text instead of sending the reader to the bottom of the page and back. Tufte CSS renders them without JavaScript but only accepts inline content. CSS anchor positioning, now supported by recent browsers,² is an elegant alternative. Sidenotes can hold several blocks, still without JavaScript, and fall back below the paragraph referencing them on narrow viewports and older browsers.

In 2023, Eric Meyer demonstrated this technique in “Nuclear Anchored Sidenotes.” The main improvement over other solutions is that the notes can sit anywhere in the HTML document. You can place them after the paragraph referencing them, as regular block elements for text browsers, screen readers, feed readers, and reader mode to render them properly:

Rendering in Lynx, a text browser

When the viewport is too narrow or the browser does not support CSS anchor positioning, you can style them so the reader can skip them or glance at them without losing their position in the text:

Rendering below the paragraph on a narrow viewport

Once the viewport is large enough, they appear in the margin, at the same vertical position as the matching reference mark, unless they would collide with a previous sidenote, as in the example below:³

Rendering in the margin on a large viewport

The gist of CSS anchoring is to position an element relative to another element—the anchor. For the sidenotes, the anchor is the reference mark. I use the following markup, with a data attribute to specify the anchor name:

<sup id="fnref:YYY" data-anchor="--lf-sn-YYY">
  <a href="#sidenote-YYY">1</a>
</sup>

The matching note is an <aside> element carrying the same data attribute for the anchor name. We put it after the paragraph holding the reference mark:

<aside role="note" id="sidenote-YYY" data-anchor="--lf-sn-YYY">
  <sup>1</sup>
  <p>A first paragraph.</p>
  <p>A second paragraph.</p>
</aside>

On a narrow viewport or when the browser is too old for CSS anchoring, we style the sidenote, which stays below its paragraph, with a muted color:

aside[role="note"] {
  margin-block: 1rlh;
  color: #444;
}

On a wide viewport and when the browser is recent enough, we move the sidenote to the right margin:

@supports (anchor-name: attr(data-anchor type(<custom-ident>))) {
  @media (min-width: 72rem) {
    main {
      position: relative;
      sup[data-anchor] {
        anchor-name: attr(data-anchor type(<custom-ident>));
        /* → anchor-name: --lf-sn-YYY */
      }
      aside[role="note"][data-anchor] {
        anchor-name: --lf-sidenote;
        position: absolute;
        position-anchor: attr(data-anchor type(<custom-ident>));
        /* → position-anchor: --lf-sn-YYY */
        top: max(anchor(top), anchor(--lf-sidenote bottom, -1rlh) + 1rlh);
        left: 100%;
        margin: 0 2rem;
        width: 18rem;
        color: inherit;
      }
    }
  }
}

attr() extracts the anchor name for the reference mark from the data-anchor attribute. It returns a string, unless we specify a CSS unit or a type, like here: the browser parses the data attribute as a custom identifier, which anchor-name validates as a dashed identifier, a custom identifier starting with two dashes.⁴

The note itself is absolutely positioned past the right edge of the main block. It selects the matching reference mark as its anchor with position-anchor set to the value of the data-anchor attribute. Each note is also an anchor named --lf-sidenote. We use it to keep the next note from colliding with this one.

The anchor() CSS function lets us position the note’s top edge relative to its anchor: anchor(top) aligns the top edge of the note with the top edge of the reference mark. It can also take another anchor as a parameter: anchor(--lf-sidenote bottom) would align the top edge of the note with the bottom edge of the closest preceding anchor named --lf-sidenote—so the previous note.⁵ Like attr(), anchor() accepts a fallback value as its second parameter and use it when the named anchor does not exist.

The top property handles three cases, illustrated in the following diagram:

The three cases for the vertical position of a note

1. The first note’s top edge aligns with the top edge of its reference mark: as there is no previous note, anchor(--lf-sidenote bottom, -1rlh) + 1rlh resolves to 0 and max() returns anchor(top).
2. When the reference mark of a later note sits above the bottom of the previous note, plus some vertical space, the note goes below the previous one to avoid a collision. max() returns anchor(--lf-sidenote bottom) + 1rlh.
3. Otherwise, the note’s top edge aligns with the reference mark’s top edge, as max() returns anchor(top).

Have a look at the complete stylesheet, which also adapts the reference mark to the location of the note: a “↓” arrow when the note sits below the paragraph, a “→” arrow when it moves to the margin. Gwern’s “Sidenotes In Web Design” lists more implementations and their trade-offs.

Some bloggers aim to write a post in 30 minutes. I planned to publish three web-related articles this weekend. Instead, I spent an inordinate amount of time elsewhere: about 15 commits on the build system, a pull request to update CSS highlighting for nested selectors in Pygments, and a small correction to MDN’s article on the anchor() CSS function. The SVG illustration took a bit less than an hour and the article itself a handful of hours. The attr() function came in after I thought “inline style looks ugly, isn’t there a better way?” But, hey, I still think this is worth it! 🎨

About the project and me

Your program crashes. You open gdb and get ?? instead of a stack trace. So you go find the right -dbgsym package, for the right version, for the right architecture, install it, and start again. Debuginfod removes that entire detour: gdb asks a server for symbols by the build-ID baked into the binary. Debusine already built packages, already produced -dbgsym files, and already hosted the archives; it just couldn’t answer the question.

This summer I made it answer. My project was to add debuginfod server functionality to Debusine so that it not only hosts -dbgsym packages, but also serves their debug symbols over the debuginfod(8) protocol. Debian developers can then debug binaries by setting a single URL that gdb uses to fetch the matching debug symbols. This project took me through design, backend work, an extraction pipeline on the worker, HTTP serving, documentation, and testing from the first blueprint all the way to a live demo on debusine.debian.net.

Initial planning and design changes

A design first, in !3030. The proposal submitted for GSoC 2026 was just an overview of how things will work, but in reality there were a lot of design questions which needed to be answered before starting with contribution. Debusine keeps development blueprints in its docs tree, reviewed like code, it’s basically a blueprint of what feature or new changes are we going to make. I was assigned the work item #957, which was basically about how the idea of implementing a debuginfod server functionality inside Debusine was initially proposed by a fellow member which later became a project idea under GSoC 2026. My developer blueprint pinned down the four decisions everything else depends on: extraction happens on the worker after the build, symbols are stored as artifacts keyed by build-ID, they’re published into suites alongside their binaries, and they’re served from the archive root rather than per-suite. Settling that up front meant the design discussions happened in a document instead of across three merged branches.

One of those arguments became its own fix. My wording implied symbols were unpacked inside the isolated sbuild environment (the consequence was I was handed a bug to be solved in the first week of contribution period), when they’re actually extracted afterwards on the worker, where the build output already sits, a distinction that matters, because doing work inside the unshare environment means extra tooling in the chroot and more ways to affect the build. !3119 corrected it before the wrong model spread into the code.

A new artifact type

Artifacts are a major concept in Debusine overall, so as per the developer blueprint we introduced a new artifact which was debian:debug-symbols. It holds every .debug file from one -dbgsym package. Its data is a validated list of lowercase 40-character build-IDs, and each file is stored under its build-ID as the path, so answering “what are the symbols for this ID?” is a direct lookup, with no path translation in the request handler. One artifact per package rather than per file: a util-linux build would otherwise spray hundreds of artifacts, collection items and relations across the database for no benefit. For implementing debian:debug-symbols artifact, I changed the main models.py file, along with that since it’s a norm to write unit tests, all mentioned under !3088.

Publishing workflow and solving a bug

Extracting symbols is only useful if they reach the archive people actually install from, so !3180 taught package_publish to follow the relates-to relation: copying binaries into a suite now brings their debug symbols along automatically, with nothing extra for the publisher to configure. Each build-ID becomes its own collection item, for example debugsym:hello_2.10-5_amd64_fcc9064… each carrying the package name, version and architecture copied from the binary, so the item is meaningful on its own without dereferencing anything. Uniqueness is enforced at both the suite and archive level, because the serving URLs are archive-wide and two suites must never disagree about what a build-ID means: republishing an identical file is accepted quietly, while two different files claiming the same ID is an error worth failing on. A partial index on the build-ID keeps the eventual HTTP lookup fast.

That looked finished until symbols started arriving in target suites disconnected from their binaries published, but unfindable, because copying items between collections silently dropped their artifact relations, and that relation is the only thing tying the two together. The fix sat one level above my feature, in the generic CopyCollectionItems task that does the copying, and since it was reusable infrastructure rather than anything debuginfod-specific, Colin implemented it himself in !3228. My project needed it to work at all; every other Debusine feature that copies items now gets it for free.

Endpoint and CI tests

With symbols in the archive, !3212 added the part users actually touch: GET /{scope}/{workspace}/buildid/<build-id>/debuginfo looks the ID up across every suite in that workspace’s archive, streams the file, and sets the X-DEBUGINFOD-FILE and X-DEBUGINFOD-SIZE headers the protocol expects. It also handles the two things gdb actually does: a HEAD probe before committing to a download, and ranged requests to pull individual ELF sections instead of the whole file. Scoping it to the archive rather than the suite is what lets one URL cover a whole workspace, so the developer never has to know which suite their binary came from.

Every merge request above landed with unit tests, but those only tell you that the pieces behave correctly. What Colin and I wanted was a real gdb fetching real symbols from a real instance, so !3261 adds an autopkgtest that builds a package, publishes it, checks the HTTP headers, then sets DEBUGINFOD_URLS and makes gdb go and get the symbols, wired into the CI integration tests so it runs on every change. It took me a day to learn that skipping the signing worker doesn’t simplify that test, it just hangs until the 30-minute timeout, because update_suites needs signing to produce a usable repository.

The last piece, !3301 covers the new artifact, the suite and archive changes, the new archive URL, and a how-to for using it. My first how-to draft explained how everything worked and offered four ways to set DEBUGINFOD_URLS; the version that shipped gives one recommended setup and gets out of the way. The same pass trimmed the blueprint down to only what’s still unimplemented, since a design document describing merged code is just an obstacle for the next reader.

What’s left

Only one item on my original plan didn’t land: an archive-level build_debug_symbols switch, modelled on Launchpad’s equivalent, letting an archive skip building -dbgsym packages entirely by passing DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=noautodbgsym to sbuild. It was always the stretch goal rather than core scope, landing the extract-publish-serve path solidly mattered more than landing it broadly. The design is written up in the blueprint, and I intend to implement it myself.

The other gaps were deliberately out of scope from the start, and the blueprint says so. DWZ supplement files aren’t ingested, so packages using compressed debug info may render without the alternate strings table; debugging still works, it’s just less complete. Source-file serving runs into the same Debian packaging limits that constrain debuginfod.debian.net today, making it a design question rather than a coding one. Executable serving, the metrics and metadata endpoints, and federation to upstream debuginfod servers were excluded for similar reasons, none of them are needed for Debusine’s core use case, and each would have crowded out the parts that are.

One open bug is left too. On the last day of the coding period, Stefano Rivera found that publishing ledger and linux was failing, because I had told the database that a build-ID identifies one exact debug file which isn’t true in Debian, since dh_dwz runs once per binary package, so when one object ships in two binary packages their .debug files differ while describing identical code. How to fix it is still an open discussion #1582, though it may not land before the formal end of the project.

None of that is a handoff. GSoC’s timeline is ending, my involvement isn’t, I’m carrying on with Debusine until both the build_debug_symbols switch and DWZ supplement support are merged, and I expect to keep contributing beyond that. This project got me familiar with a codebase I enjoy working in, and the remaining pieces are mine to finish.

Thanks!

The biggest thanks go to my mentor, Colin Watson, whose reviews consistently found the thing I hadn’t thought about. He also gave me room to get things wrong first and understand why, which taught me more than being handed the answer would have.

Thanks as well to Raphaël Hertzog, Enrico Zini, Stefano Rivera, Carles Pina i Estany and Helmut Grohne and everyone else around Debusine and Freexian for reviews, comments and patience with my questions.

Special thanks to Freexian for developing Debusine in the open and for giving me access to test on debusine.debian.net.

Finally, thanks to the wider Debian community, whose build-ID and -dbgsym conventions did most of the hard work before I arrived and to Google Summer of Code for providing a platform and the time to do this properly.